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Consumer Actions Against Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices: The
Private Uses of Federal Trade
Commission Jurisprudence
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER*
MICHAEL H. LIPSON**
Introduction
Between the 1960's and the present, most states enacted consumer
protection legislation designed to parallel and supplement the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act (the Act).' These state statutes, which
we will refer to as UDAP statutes for "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," had their genesis in various forms suggested to the states
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission)2 and the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo. B.A., 1964, University of
Texas; M.A., 1967, University of Illinois; J.D., 1971, University of Texas; LL.M., 1977, New
York University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo. BA., 1966, University of Con-
necticut; J.D., 1969, George Washington University; LL.M., 1972, Georgetown Univer-
sity.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the FTC Act]. Although there are
variations in the utility and scope of these state provisions, see notes 64-79 infra and
accompanying text, every state but one - Alabama - has enacted such a law. J. SHEL-
DON & G. ZWEIBLE, SURVEY OF CONSUMER FRAUD LAw 13 (1978).
2. See generally Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L.
REv. 271, 275 (1971) [hereinafter Lovett I]. In 1970, the FTC offered three alternative
drafts of an Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law: Alternate Form No.
1 contains the broad language of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting
"unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in trade or
commerce; Alternate Form No. 2 outlaws all forms of fraudulent, deceptive and some-
times unfair acts or practices in trade or commerce; and Alternate Form No. 3 itemizes
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.3 The Commission strongly
encouraged these state-level activities, recognizing that enforcement
of the Act's broad section 5 proscription against "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" could not possibly be accomplished without extra-
agency assistance.4
In contrast to the Federal Trade Commission Act and most inter-
pretations of it,5 a large number of state UDAP statutes contain provi-
sions that give consumers the right to bring civil actions for damages
and other forms of relief against those who violate the broad legal
proscriptions contained in these laws.6 These private remedy provi-
sions, however, have been used only sporadically by consumers since
the enactment of the statutes.
We believe that the value of UDAP statutes in private consumer
protection litigation has been severely underestimated. More specifi-
cally, we view the consumer protection jurisprudence developed by
the FTC under section 5 as having great importance to consumers in
need of redress, and we are convinced that the state courts will make
use of it in construing UDAP provisions. Our thesis, accordingly, is
that consumers can and should use state UDAP provisions more fre-
quently7 and effectively to enforce this federal jurisprudence in pri-
vate actions brought in state court.
Part I of this article focuses on the federal courts' treatment of pri-
vate claims asserted under section 5, and on the FTC's historical and
current role in consumer protection. Part 11 continues with a detailed
description of the UDAP statutes, a discussion of the manner in
which many state courts have read them in light of the FTC's juris-
prudence, and an examination of some practical aspects of UDAP
consumer litigation, namely, remedies, class actions, and awards of
attorneys' fees. We conclude in Part III with a proffered justification
the deceptive practices proscribed, and usually contains a "catch-all" clause reaching
all other forms of deception. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION C4-C5 (1970). See generally Lovett, Deceptive Trade Practices, 46 TuLANE
L. REv. 724, 730-31 (1972) [hereinafter Lovett I].
3. Two of the Commissioners' "uniform" statutes have been adopted in a variety
of forms by the states: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 35 (1978);
and the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1978). Because the former
allows private consumer actions only for injunctive relief, its usefulness to consumers
is questionable. See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1101, 1110-113. The latter statute, however, contains broad
damages and other remedy provisions providing the aggrieved consumer with more
incentive to take action and ability to obtain redress. See generally Rice, Uniform Con-
snumer Sales Practices Act - Damages Remedies: The NCCUSL Giveth and Taketh
Away, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1972).
4. See Lovett II, supra note 2, at 727 n.1, 729 n.10, 730 nn.14 & 15 (1972); L. RIcME &
H.I. SAsERsTErN, Private Actions for Consumer Injury Under State Law - The Role of
the Federal Trade Commission, in FTC TRADE REGULATION - ADVERTIsNG, RuLEuK-
ING AND NEW CONSUMER PROTECTION 415 (1979).
5. See notes 8-17 infra and accompanying text.
6. All of the state statutes referred to in this article are cited and classified by
type, available remedies and procedural features in the Appendix, infra. See also J.
SHELDON & G. ZwEmEL, supra note 1, at 103, indicating that all of the state UDAP stat-
utes which allow private actions by consumers provide for the recovery of money dam-
ages.
7. As we will discuss, there are substantial differences in the utility to consumers
of the various UDAP statutes and, under some statutes, the private remedy may be
illusory. See note 3 supra.
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for these private actions and some speculation on future prospects
under the statutes.
Part I- The Scope and Limitations of FTC Consumer
Protection
Private Actions Under Section 5
Injured consumers have no private cause of action under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 Because of the nature of the
FTC's jurisdictional authority, the extent to which consumers are
protected under the federal law depends upon the FTC's willingness
to act.9 In the leading case of Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp.,10 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reconfirmed the federal courts' traditional reluctance to construe sec-
tion 5 to encompass private actions." The court based its decision
upon the legislative history of the Act and the underlying policy
favoring a purely public enforcement mechanism.' 2 It noted that the
FTC is an expert body consisting of lawyers, economists, and other
professionals who develop public policy in a reasoned and orderly
fashion rather than by piecemeal private suits.' 3 Although private en-
forcement would deter deceptive and misleading practices, the court
concluded that Congress, in amending section 5 in 1938, intended the
Commission to use prospective remedies, such as cease and desist
orders and assurances of voluntary compliance, to eliminate these
practices.' 4 A private remedy, the court reasoned, would constitute a
gross departure from this general reliance on prospective remedies
and would overly penalize companies that had committed practices
not considered unfair, deceptive, or misleading prior to their commis-
sion.15
8. See cases cited in Carlson v. Coca Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973).
9. Whether and whom to prosecute is within the agency's sound discretion. A
private party may not bring an enforcement action before the FTC or a court. Nor does
the enabling legislation require the Commission to enforce the FTC Act in any particu-
lar way. The FTC is not required to proceed by issuing a formal complaint and by
giving the respondent an opportunity to explain his conduct in a formal trial type hear-
ing. Rather, the FTC may regulate by informal or formal means; it may seek to regulate
all businesses, one industry or only one firm. See G. ROBINsON, E. GELLHORN & H.
BRUFF, THE ADmINSTRATvE PROCESS 581 (2d ed. 1980). Although the courts have con-
sistently rejected a private right of action under § 5 of the FTC Act, their rulings have
not been as restrictive for other federal statutes. See, e.g., Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970) (Bank Service Corporation Act);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555 (1969) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); J1.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
10. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11. Id. at 998-1000.
12. Id. at 991.
13. Id. at 992-97.
14. Id. at 999-1000. See generally Note, Private Enforcement and Rulemaking Under
the Federal Trade Commission Act: Expansion of FTC Responsibility, 69 Nw. U.L. REv.
462 (1974).
15. Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d at 998; see note 9 supra. But see
1980]
Although the attempt to extend section 5 to permit private actions
did not die with Holloway, the case law and legislative history give
little hope to those who favor such a construction of the statute.16
Amendments that would create a private right of action have been
offered in Congress, but they have failed to win approval. 17
Any hope consumers may have of enforcing section 5's proscrip-
tions in private actions must be found in state UDAP statutes. The
result sought by the plaintiffs in Holloway and other cases can be
achieved in state court actions in which the courts employ ever-de-
veloping FTC jurisprudence. As background for our discussion of
these statutes and the treatment they have been accorded by state
courts, we will briefly review the Commission's history as a consumer
protection institution, and the content of its jurisprudence.
A Short Course in FTC History and Jurisprudence
The broad sweep of FTC history reveals a continuous expansion of its
power to protect consumer interests. Ironically, the purpose of the
FTC, on its creation in 1914, was not to protect the consumer, but
rather to strengthen the enforcement of the antitrust laws - an artic-"
ulation of Congress's displeasure with the judicially-created "rule of
reason."' 8 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, originally
declaring unfair methods of competition unlawful, was designed to
fulfill the need for a broad statutory regime that would enable the
agency to act against new varieties of anticompetitive practices in
their incipiency.19
The fear was, however, that a statute of such breadth would be-
come a source of vexatious litigation and over-zealous and burden-
some enforcement.20 To temper this fear, the FTC was not given the
power to impose criminal penalties. Rather, it was to enforce the stat-
ute by an equity-like proceeding culminating in a cease and desist
order.21 In addition, the Act contemplated purely public enforcement
by an expert body defending the "public interest," rather than en-
Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfufilled: A Different View of Private Enforcement Under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 274, 278-82 (1975).
16. See Bott v. Holiday Universal Inc., [1976-2] TrAde Cas. (CCH) 60,973 at 617,22
F-R. Serv. 2d 615, (D.D.C. 1976). But see Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F.
Supp. 582, 587 (N.D. Ind. 1976), the only case allowing a private right of action under § 5
in certain limited circumstances. In Guernsey, a private right of action under § 5 was
recognized where the FTC had declared the defendants' acts unlawful thirteen years
before in another proceeding, and had issued a cease and desist order against them.
Id. at 587-589. The court distinguished Holloway, in which the private litigants were
attempting to establish a private right, on the basis that the defendants' actions had
already been declared unlawful by the FTC in a separate proceeding. Id. at 587. Guern-
sey, however, appears to be an anomaly, and is not followed in other jurisdictions.
17. See H.R& 3816, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); HMR REP. No. 95-339, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15-17 (1977); S. 1288, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 642, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). Both the Senate and House rejected legislation which would have authorized
individual and class actions for those injured by the violation of a trade regulation rule
or of a final cease and desist order. Prospects for passage of such legislation appear
dim, particularly now that the activities of the FTC have become so controversial. See
notes 56-62 infra and accompanying text.
18. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 16-17 (1924).
19. Id. at 46.
20. See Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 436 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Kintner &
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forcement by private parties pursuing their own selfish interests. 22
Section 5(b) thus limits the Commission's jurisdiction to cases in
which it shall appear that a proceeding would be in the interest of the
public.2
3
Soon after the passage of the Act, the Commission sought to ex-
pand its authority over unfair methods of competition into the field of
false and misleading advertising.24 With the passage of the Wheeler-
Lea Amendment in 1938,25 adding the phrase "and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce" to section 5's prohibition of unfair
methods of competition, the FTC was expressly given the authority
to proscribe practices that were unfair or misleading to the public,
but not injurious to competitors.26 The Commission's powers to en-
courage truth in advertising and fair merchandising practices have
been used often since then in efforts to ensure that consumers re-
ceive both the information necessary to make intelligent choices in
the marketplace and the opportunity to use that information effec-
tively.27
During most of the first several decades following passage of the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, the law-making and enforcement activi-
Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer
Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L.R 651, 654-55 (1975).
22. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 656 (2d ed. 1974).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 45b (1976). This provision was interpreted narrowly by Justice
Brandeis in FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929), which involved a passing off claim be-
tween two competitors. The Court required the FTC, before issuing a cease and desist
order against a deceptive practice, to show a specific and substantial public interest as
opposed to a private right. Id. at 27. The Court concluded that the alleged unfair com-
petition arose out of a controversy essentially private in nature. Id. at 30.
Since Klesner, however, the courts have deferred to the FTC's determination of the
public interest. For example, in Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962), the majority stated, "once we say that the courts
should exercise their judgment as to whether an alleged deception is of sufficient im-
portance to warrant Commission action, we get into matters which are not entrusted to
us and as to which we have little qualification and even less necessary information."
Id. at 873. Thus, although there may be a limited review of the Commission's finding
that a proceeding is in the public interest, the statutory limitation may have a practical
effect on the Commission, encouraging restraint in case selection. See M. CALLmANN,
UNFAIR COMPETrION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 94.3(c) (3d ed. 1967); French, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Public Interest, 49 MINN. L REV. 539, 550 (1965).
24. See FTC v. Winstead Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 491 (1922); FTC v. Yangle, 1
F.T.C. 13, 15-16 (1916); FTC v. A. Theo. Abbott & Co., 1 F.T.C. 16, 19-20 (1916).
25. Wheeler-Lea Amendment, Pub. L No. 447, §§ 1-5, 52 Stat. 111 (amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58).
26. The Commission's authority to prohibit false advertising without showing in-
jury to competitors had suffered a setback in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646
(1931). The Commission found that petitioner's obesity cure advertised as safe and
usable without discomfort was actually dangerous and harmful. Id. at 645-46. Although
the Commission found deception, it made no finding of competitive harm. Justice
Sutherland, writing for the majority, found the Commission's authority limited to prac-
tices which injured competitors. Id. at 649. The Raladam holding was expressly repu-
diated by the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938.
27. The Commission's authority to act against deceptive practices without having
to show anticompetitive effect was confirmed in Pep Boys - Manny, Moe and Jack,
Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 160 (3d Cir. 1941).
1980]
ties of the FTC in the consumer protection area were concentrated on
the problem of deceptive practices. 28 Consistent with its self-limited
role, the Commission expended most of its energies on preventing
deception, for example, by promulgating "trade practice rules" or "in-
dustry guides," 2 9 or on ensuring its cessation by adjudicating "cease
and desist" cases, obtaining consent orders, or acquiring assurances
of voluntary compliance.30 The agency appears to have given little at-
tention to the effect of deceptive practices on the consumer, to other
practices that injured consumers more, to measuring the injury
caused by such practices, or to the need to allocate resources to re-
medial or compensatory activities on behalf of the consumer. As a
result, the impact of FTC jurisprudence on consumers was limited, at
best.31
Major changes in the Commission's focus came with the "con-
sumer movement. '32 The Commission's involvement in areas beyond
28. For an exhaustive list of deceptive practices see [1971] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 7575-77; E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 443,
Appendix I (1971). Some of the practices may be categorized as: characteristics of
products, see, e.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 70 (1934) (yellow pine sold
as white pine); testimonials and endorsements, see, e.g., Mattel, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,735 (F.T.C. 1971) (order prohibits endorsements
by famous personalities unless they have the expertise to substantiate their opinions);
pricing claims, see, e.g., FTC v. Mary Carter Paint, 382 U.S. 46, 47 (1965) (deceptive
advertising of "free" goods); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1969) (false
claims of price reductions); guarantees, see, e.g., Sibert v. FTC, 367 F.2d 364, 365 (2d Cir.
1966) (failure to disclose service charges attached to guarantees is deceptive); demon-
strations on television, see, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 376 (1965)
(deceptive use of mockups on television); deceptive sales, see, e.g., Arthur Murray Stu-
dio of Washington, Inc. v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1972) (inducing unwary per-
sons into entering dance lesson contracts at exhorbitant prices is prohibited); cooling-
off period for door-to-door sales, see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1980); business torts, see, e.g.,
Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28, 29 (7th Cir. 1963) (passing off as a violation of
§ 5), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); business status, see, e.g., FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,
288 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1933) ("milling company" designation is unfair where company
does no milling).
29. See, e.g., Trade Practice Rule, Handkerchief Industry, 16 C.F.R_ § 181 (Supp.
1958) Trade Practice Rule, Jewelry Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 23 (1960); Guides Against De-
ceptive Advertising of Guarantees, 16 C.F.R. § 239 (1977); Guides Against Deceptive
Pricing, 16 C.F.R. § 233 (1977); Guides Against Debt Collection Deception, 16 C.F.R.
§ 237 (1977).
30. See cases cited note 28 supra.
31. To explore this notion fully would be beyond the scope of this article. The fail-
ure of the Commission to attend to the problem of consumer injury is, in part, attribu-
table to the manner in which it developed the jurisprudence of deception. The
Commission's "business" has been largely confined to obtaining a cessation of unlaw-
ful conduct in the future. Because of this focus, the Commission need not show actual
consumer injury in order to prevail. Charles of the Ritz Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680
(2d Cir. 1944).
Given the conceptual difficulties retrospective relief under § 5 was thought to raise,
see, e.g., Sebert, Obtaining Monetary Redress for Consumers Through Action by the
Federal Trade Commission, 57 MINN. L. REV. 225, 237 (1972), the absence of useful rules
of trade regulation law relating to compensation for consumers is not surprising. One
can look in vain for pre-1960's cases in which the FTC, in dictum or otherwise, provided
the theoretical premise for a private consumer's action to obtain damages after having
purchased Product X, rather than less expensive Product Y, as the result of deceptive
representation.
32. Many of these structural and policy changes were precipitated by the publica-
tion of three studies highly critical of the Commisssion. See, e.g., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH,
& T. SCHULTZ, NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Nader Report]; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ABA CoMMssION
TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report];
J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, SUBcOMITTEE
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mere deception and the impact of other practices on consumers were
manifested in a variety of ways. In several "cease and desist" pro-
ceedings, for example, the Commission took action against a number
of "business opportunity" schemes.33 In each of these cases, the re-
spondent's practices were alleged or found to be "fraudulent," and to
have caused actual monetary loss to the consumer-victims.34 Al-
though the FTC proceedings did not achieve redress for those vic-
tims, the agency's aggressive activity undoubtedly deterred like-
minded schemers and encouraged similar local enforcement efforts.3 5
The Commission also began to show a serious interest in the con-
sumer sales industry by challenging the validity of contractual trans-
actions between buyers and sellers that were induced by high
pressure tactics. The result of these efforts is illustrated by numerous
litigated and consent orders in which sellers of goods or services
were required to allow buyers a so-called "cooling-off" period in
which to cancel purchases without penalty.36 Finally, following its
victory in the Sperry & Hutchinson case,37 the Commission com-
menced a program designed, in part, to address the problems of low-
income consumers by giving content to the "unfairness" proscription
of section 5.38 In particular, the Commission intensified its efforts
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
86TH CONG., 2D SESS. 4-5, 48-52 (Comm. Print 1960).
33. See, e.g., Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
I] 20,755 (F.T.C. 1975) (vocational school); Holiday Magic, Inc., [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,757 (F.T.C. 1974) (pyramid sales); Postage Stamp
Service Bur., Inc., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,371 (F.T.C.
1973) (stamp machines); Universal Credit Card Acceptance Corp., [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,240 (F.T.C. 1973) (credit card program); Curtis
Publishing Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,719 (F.T.C.
1971) (magazine subscriptions); Universal Electronics Corp.,[1970-73 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,930 (F.T.C. 1971) (tube testing machines).
34. See, e.g., Universal Credit Card Acceptance Corp. [1970-73 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,938 (F.T.C. 1972).
35. See cases collected in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANALY-
SIS AND DIGEST OF CONSUMER PROTECTION CASE LAW 58 (1974).
36. See, e.g., American Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 21,014 (F.T.C. 1975) (vocational school); Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,529 (F.T.C.
1971) (dance instruction); Household Sewing Machine Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 18,882 (F.T.C. 1969) (sewing machines). Such cases pre-
ceded, of course, the Commission's promulgation of a Trade Regulation Rule covering
"cooling off" periods in door-to-door sales transactions. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1980).
37. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
38. See generally D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARRoLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING
SERVICE § 3.05, at 75, § 3.16, at 91-102 (1979); Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-
The FTC Response, 26 FOOD DRUG & COSM. UJ. 609, 616 (1971).
The Commission has found unfairness in the following areas: (1) affirmative disclo-
sure: e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884. 891 (6th Cir. 1967) (advertiser must
affirmatively disclose that symptoms of fatigue are not usually caused by factors the
advertiser's product was designed to remedy); Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers
on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 16 C.F.R. § 422 (1973); Care Labeling of Textile Wear-
ing Apparel, 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1973); (2) advertising substantiation: e.g., Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,112 (F.T.C 1972),
(advertiser must have a reasonable basis for a tire safety claim), affd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th
1980]
against unfair credit and debt collection practices, and devoted more
of its resources toward practices it characterized as "metropolitan
fraud."3 9
The Commission also used its "unfairness" powers to reach prac-
tices that exploited consumers' "psychological needs," but which
were not deceptive in the traditional sense.40 In addition, the agency
began to act more vigorously and with greater imagination to elimi-
nate or limit various practices having a more direct impact on con-
sumers' pocketbooks - "bait and switch" selling techniques, 4 1
inflated pricing coupled with "easy credit" claims,4 2 transactions in-
volving financiers, whose arrangements with sellers of shoddy mer-
chandise deprived consumers of effective remedies, 43 and the
sending of unsolicited mail-order merchandise followed by demands
for payment.44
A new sensitivity to consumer problems among the members of
Congress paralleled FTC "activism" during this period. In the late
1960's and through much of the 1970's, Congress moved to provide
consumers with federal protection in a variety of areas by conferring
on the FTC and other agencies new and broader substantive enforce-
ment responsibilities, and by giving consumers new federal claims.
In 1968 the Consumer Credit Protection Act (or "Truth-in-Lending"
Act)4 5 was enacted to afford consumers uniform and truthful infor-
mation with which to make comparative decisions about the
"purchase" of credit.4 6 Other federal laws soon followed, protecting
consumers against racial and sex discrimination in credit granting,47
Cir. 1973); (3) unconscionability and exploitation of consumer weaknesses: see Rule
Relating to the Use of Negative Option Plans, 16 C.F.R. § 425 (1980) (consumers' ten-
dency to procrastinate protected by requiring adequate lead time and return privileges
for such endeavors as book and record clubs); Cooling Off Period for Door-to-Door
Sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1980) (a three day cooling-off period is provided to protect con-
sumers against an inherent lack of sales resistance).
39. For example, the Commission embarked upon an ambitious program in 1972 to
develop "unfairness" cases which would impact upon "ghetto fraud," specifically fo-
cusing upon adhesive contract provisions and creditors' remedies widely used in ghet-
to selling and in the collection of low-income consumer debts. Memorandum from
Morton Needelman, Assistant Director for Evaluation, Bureau of Consumer Protection
to the Federal Trade Commission, (regarding the Metropolitan Retail Program) (Sept.
9, 1972). Later, this program evolved into a Trade Regulation Rule proceeding entitled
"Credit Practices." See 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347-50 (Apr. 11, 1975).
40. See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co., 81 F.T.C. 238, 244 (1972) (advertising for an over-the-
counter stimulant (Vivarin) which was claimed to "make one more exciting and attrac-
tive, improve one's personality, marriage, and sex life, and solve marital and personal
problems"); Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 58-59 (1972).
41. See, e.g., Carpets "R" Us, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 303, 320-21 (1976); James Neece, 86
F.T.C. 845, 853 (1975); Dowd's Inc., 77 F.T.C. 270, 274 (1970).
42. See, e.g., In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1406 (1968), af'd, 437 F.2d 707
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
43. See All State Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1970) (disclosure
that installment contracts might be assigned with consequent loss of defenses against
assignee), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970). See also Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1980).
44. See Portwood v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419,421 (10th Cir. 1969) (disclosures that mailees
are under no duty to return or preserve unsolicited merchandise, and no duty to pay
unless decision is made to purchase it).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976).
46. See Mourning v. Family Publication Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1972).
47. Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (as amended, 90 Stat. 251
(1976)); "Regulation B", 12 C.F.R. §§ 201-202.1104 (1976).
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abusive practices by credit reporting agencies,48 unfair periodic bill-
ing practices, 49 unreasonable and harmful debt collection practices,50
and inadequate consumer product warranty remedies. 51 In each of
these areas, Congress gave the FTC significant enforcement and reg-
ulatory authority which it could and did exercise under section 5.52
The foregoing developments highlight an important point: during
the past decade, the FTC's activities under the general proscriptions
in section 5 and this new body of federal statutory consumer protec-
tion law have created a wealth of jurisprudence that is enormously
valuable to consumers. The question posed, however, is how will this
jurisprudence actually benefit consumers? Under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975,53 the Commission was authorized to bring civil actions to re-
dress consumer injury.5 This new statutory provision was expected
by some to provide the Commission, finally, with the tools it required
to protect consumers' monetary interests effectively.5 5
48. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
49. Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1976).
50. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Supp. 1 1977).
51. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
52. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976) (Truth in Lending enforcement); 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (Fair Credit Reporting Act enforcement and interpretations); 15
U.S.C. § 1692 (1977) (Fair Debt Collection Practices enforcement); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
2312 (1976) (warranty act rulemaking).
53. Pub. I. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
54. The Commission may sue in a district court or a state court of competent juris-
diction for relief including, but not limited to, the following: rescission or reformation
of contracts, refund of money or return of property, and payment of damages. 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b(a)-(b) (1976). The court is not empowered, however, to award any exemplary or
punitive damages. Id. § 57b(b) (1976). The authority of the Commission to obtain re-
dress by such proceedings is limited. It may do so only where consumers have been
injured: (1) by violations of Commission trade regulation rules which constitute unfair
or deceptive acts or practices, id. § 57b(a) (1) (1976), or (2) by violations of the broad
§ 5 proscription, but only where such a violation led to the issuance of a cease and
desist order "and" where a reasonable man would have known under the circum-
stances that the act or practice was dishonest or fraudulent. Id. §57b(a) (2) (1976).
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the many questions the foregoing
amendments raise. Illuminating discussions of many of these questions may be found,
however, in the following C. SMiTH & C. WITr, FrC TRADE REGULATION - ADVERTIS-
ING, RULEMAKING AND NEW CONSUMER PROTECTION 337-67 (1979); B. MEZINES & J.T.
RoscH, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN 1975 - WARAmTIES, CONSUMER REDRESS,
RULEuAKiNG 163 (1975); Kinter & Smith, supra note 21, at 669; D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CAR-
ROL, supra note 38, §§ 3.03, 3.16.
55. See Kintner & Westermeier, Obtaining Refunds for Consumers Under Section
19 ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1025, 1038-43 (1978). The
General Accounting Office has recently cast doubt upon the FTC's ability to obtain
consumer redress under Magnuson Moss. See U.S. COMP. GEN., GAO REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: VICTIMS OF UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES GET LIMITED HELP FROM THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1978). The GAO studied 24 consumer redress cases brought
by the FTC during a one year period (June 1977 to August 1978); the Commission ob-
tained no redress in 12 cases. ld at 8-10. In most of the others the recovery was small.
Id. at 8. The GAO attributed the FTC's failure to obtain adequate redress on behalf of
consumers to the FTC's time-consuming procedures, id. at 12-16, internal management
problems, id. at 19-23, and the weak financial position of many of the businesses it
investigates. Id. at 1-11.
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What seemed to be limitless possibilities for the FTC's consumer
protection activities, however, are now in doubt. In the few years fol-
lowing passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the FTC lost its charmed
position by attempting to exercise its authority in innovative areas
like children's advertising.5 6 Moreover, both the business community
and the press have scorned the agency for wasting its resources by
promoting excessive regulation through rulemaking.57 The result of
this political groundswell was the FTC Improvements Act of 1980,58
which reduced the Commission's power to issue rules applying to
certain industries,5 9 and subjected its remaining rulemaking author-
ity to a two-house legislative veto, which cannot in turn be vetoed by
the President.60
Despite the 1980 amendments, the Commission's broad jurisdic-
tional authority to protect consumer interests remains basically in-
tact.6 1 Nevertheless, its recent experiences may force the FTC to
keep its eye constantly on the political currents of the day. In addi-
tion, budgetary curtailments in an "era of limits" may well further
reduce the Commission's practical ability to use its enforcement au-
thority fully.62 On the other hand, the Commission undoubtedly will
continue to build a body of consumer protection law by rule and adju-
dication, adding to the already substantial body of jurisprudence de-
veloped through the years.63 When considered in conjunction with
the private remedy provisions contained in state UDAP statutes, the
construction of those statutes by the state courts, and the expansion
in the availability of legal services to the populace as a whole, this
56. See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978).
57. See Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1979, at A20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at D5, col 4;
Gellhorn, The Wages of Zealotry: The FTC Under Seige, REGULATION 33, 38 (Jan./Feb.
1980).
58. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 58).
59. Restrictions have been placed on Commission activities in private standard
setting and certification, Pub. L. No. 96- 252, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (1) (B); insurance, id.
§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 46; children's advertising, id. § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 57a; generic trademarks,
id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 41; agricultural cooperatives, id. § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 41; the funeral
industry, id. § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 41. See CoNF. REP. No. 96-917 ON H.R. 2313, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980) (as approved by conferrees), reprinted in [1980] ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 963 (May 8, 1980).
60. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, § 21(a) (to be codified in
15 U.S.C. § 57a); see CoNF. REP., supra note 59, § 21. There is considerable doubt about
the constitutionality of such a legislative veto provision. See generally Dixon, The Con-
gressional Veto and Separation of Powers, 56 N.C. L REv. 423 (1978). Perhaps because
of these doubts, the amendments provide that any interested person may institute a
declaratory judgment action in a United States District Court for a determination of
the constitutionality of any of these provisions. Id. § 21(f).
61. It is too soon to predict what the next phase of the FTC will be - whether the
agency will be dismantled completely or whether it will further increase its efforts in
fields over which it has authority and interest.
62. See generally 126 CONG. REC. S6111 (daily ed. June 3, 1980).
63. See generally Givens, FTC Amendments of 1980, 183 N.Y.LJ. 1, col. 1 (June 16,
1980). Givens, a former New York Regional Director of the FT'C, predicts: "In choosing
how to employ its resources and seeking to avoid repetition of the legislative results of
1980, the Commission might take into account the areas of greatest concern to the gen-
eral public, the support of which is essential to its activities and indeed in the end, its
continued existence. Where public concern is at a lower level, an agency may, of
course, also proceed by seeking to find common ground among those concerned with a
problem, in which event investment of political energy on both sides may be minimal."
Id. at 4.
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jurisprudence will bring on a new era in which consumers, seeking
direct, private redress for injuries to their interests, will play an in-
creasingly important role in comparison to the FTC.
To demonstrate the manner in which we believe this development
will transpire, we turn in Part 11 of this article to an examination of
the UDAP statutes and practice under them.
Part II: Practice and Prospects Under UDAP Statutes
The Statutory Variations
Legislation more or less paralleling the proscription against "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" contained in section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act is now in effect in forty-nine states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin
Islands.64 The UDAP statutes, however, vary in the legal prohibitions
they employ as well as in the types of relief they make available to
consumers.
Presently, the largest number of UDAP statutes contain language
either identical to section 5 - including unfair methods of competi-
tion - or a proscription against "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices" alone.65 A substantial number of the statutes itemize certain
deceptive practices that are per se unlawful, with or without a "catch-
all" phrase designed to reach any others.66 Provisions in other stat-
utes also outlaw fraudulent and/or unconscionable practices. 67
Unlike section 5, forty-two state statutes expressly provide that
consumers may sue those engaged in prohibited practices to recover
damages or to obtain other relief.68 The statutes commonly permit
rescission of transactions that violate statutory proscriptions. 69 Re-
covery of actual damages is allowed under all of the private action
provisions, and under most provisions the prevailing consumer may
be granted an award of attorney's fees. 70 The fee award provisions
are intended to permit consumers to attract competent counsel to
represent them in connection with the claims created by the statutes,
and to provide an incentive for consumers to engage in litigation to
64. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FACT SHEET, STATE LEGISLATION TO COMBAT UN-
FAIR TRADE PRACTICES I (rev. Nov. 1979) [hereinafter FTC FACT SHEET].
65. See Appendix cols. 1 & 2, infra; FTC FACT SHEET, supra note 64, at 1.
66. See Appendix col. 3, infra.
67. Id. col. 4.
68. Id. col 6. In addition, the courts of two other states, Arizona and Delaware,
have construed UDAP statutes to provide an implied right of action. See Selinger v.
Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 576, 521 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1974); Young v.
Joyce, 351 A.2d 857, 859 (Del. 1975).
69. See Appendix col. 10, infra; see, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110g(a),(d)
(West 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 270a(a) (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.09(A) (Anderson 1979).
70. See Appendix col. 12, infra.
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protect their rights so that the statutes will be fully enforced.7 1
Many UDAP statutes give additional incentives to those contem-
plating private actions by providing for the recovery of more than ac-
tual damages. Seventeen states provide for the doubling or trebling
of actual damages in such actions.7 2 Multiple damages may be
mandatory,7 3 may depend upon whether the violation was knowing
or intentional,74 or may be available only in the discretion of the
court.7 5 In sixteen states, consumer-litigants may obtain minimum
statutory damages (commonly $100 to $300) or their actual damages,
whichever are higher.7 6 Twelve states also provide for the imposition
of punitive damages in consumer actions,77 though such damage
awards ordinarily are reserved for instances in which the violator's
acts constituted a grievous violation of societal interests.7 8
Although generalizations about the meaning and utility of statutes
that vary in many of their particulars must be made cautiously, the
manner in which the proscriptions of UDAP statutes have been con-
strued by the state courts indicates that the state courts do not re-
gard the differences among these statutes as extensive. To the
contrary, state court decisions under "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" statutes demonstrate a clear trend toward permitting con-
sumers to premise private actions on past and present FT'C initia-
tives against such activities. More specifically, state courts applying
these statutes increasingly have adopted the standards of "unfair-
ness" and "deception" that have been developed and used by the
FTC, and approved by the federal courts.7 9
71. See, e.g., Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 201 (Me. 1970). See also Lovett I, supra
note 2, at 281-82; Schulman, Little F.T.C. Act: The Neglected Alternative, 9 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PRoc. 351, 369 (1976).
72. See Appendix col. 8, infra. Treble damage provisions are designed to en-
courage UDAP enforcement by private individuals injured by unfair trade practices.
See Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1979). As Lovett
notes, the potential of double or treble damage liability also can be expected to lead to
more pre-litigation settlements, because it enhances consumers' bargaining power at
that stage of the proceedings. See Lovett I, supra note 2, at 285.
73. See, e.g., Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 271, 390 A.2d 566, 571
(1978) (Pashman, J., concurring); Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 377-78, 358
A.2d 473, 479 (1976); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 105-106, 245
S.E.2d 801, 807 (1978); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671 (Tex. 1977).
74. See, e.g., Attaway v. Tom's Auto Sales, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 813, 815,242 S.E.2d 740,
742 (1978).
75. One example of such a provision is the Vermont statute, under which the court
may grant recovery of "exemplary damages not exceeding three times the value of the
consideration given." 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2461(b) (1980).
76. See Appendix col. 7, infra. A recent Oregon case involving a minimum dam-
ages remedy is a good example. See Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, 285 Or.
481, 490, 592 P.2d 196, 200 (1979). In Crooks, the consumer's actual damages amounted,
arguably, to only $2.00, but he recovered $200.
77. See Appendix col. 9, infra.
78. See, e.g., Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, 285 Or. 481, 488, 592 P.2d
196, 199 (1979); Allen v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 273 Or. 614,542 P.2d 896, 898 (1975). Cf.
Hoffman v. Ryan, 422 N.Y.S.2d 288, 291-92 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (punitive damages "may be
assessed to deter consumer fraud .... '[Ilf punitive damages are to be awarded to
protect the public from continuation of a fraudulent consumer scheme, they must be
taxed in an amount which will accomplish that purpose.' ").
79. Although our focus is on the interrelationship between UDAP statutes and the
jurisprudence of the FTC, it is worth noting that the scope of the state statutes often
enables consumers to initiate action in subject areas over which the Commission has
no jurisdiction, or as to which it has shown little interest. For example, a New Jersey
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Adoption of FTC Standards
Although the vast body of federal trade practices law interpreting the
unfairness and deception proscriptions of section 5 was developed by
an agency that cannot act on behalf of individual consumers,80 and
that, until recently, was empowered to employ only prospective rem-
edies, the state courts have used this jurisprudence, almost without
hesitation, to afford consumers retrospective redress in private
UDAP actions.8 ' The explanation for this state-level adoption of fed-
eral standards lies largely in the statutes themselves.
More than twenty UDAP statutes specifically direct the state
courts to employ the jurisprudence of the FrC, the federal courts, or
both in construing the enumerated statutory proscriptions.8 2 Even
court trebled damages in a medical malpractice action, in which the consumer relied
on that state's UDAP statute in asserting that the defendant had failed to disclose ma-
terial risks involved in the use of an intra-uterine device. Jones v. Sportelli, 166 N.J.
Super. 383, 390, 399 A.2d 1047, 1051 (1979). Litigation under the statutes has also in-
volved such topics as utility rate charges, see Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 79
Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 49-50, 385 N.E.2d 240, 242-43 (1979); insurance company claims prac-
tices, see Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex Civ.
App. 1978); Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d. 355, 357, 581 P.2d 1349, 1350
(1978); Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 365 N.E.2d 802, 803 (1977); household goods
movers' practices, see American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 287
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); and landlord-tenant relationships, see Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C.
App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1977); York v. Sullivan, 369 Mass. 157, 159, 338 N.E.2d 341,
344 (1975). On the other hand, some state courts have read legislative instructions to
construe the statutes by reference to § 5 of the FTC Act, see notes 80-83 infra and ac-
companying text, to limit the scope of such statutes to subjects over which the Com-
mission has jurisdiction. See, e.g., Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 596 P.2d 429, 432
(Idaho 1979) (since the FTC Act exempts banks, so does the Idaho UDAP statute).
80. This limitation is imposed by the "public interest" standard by which FTC ju-
risdiction is constrained. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976); FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27-28
(1929); notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
81. There has been some scholarly debate about the propriety of using legal stan-
dards developed in the context of governmental enforcement activities to afford pri-
vate relief to consumers. Compare Lynn, Anatomy of a Deceptive Trade Practices
Case, 31 S.W.L.J. 867, 869-71 (1977) (arguing against the use of the "capacity to deceive"
test) with Note, Toward Effective Consumer Law Enforcement: The Capacity to
Deceive Test Applied to Private Actions, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 457, 473-74 (1975) (adoption
of the capacity to deceive test -would provide consumers with more incentive to pro-
ceed under state consumer fraud laws). Most state courts, however, have not under-
taken this sort of analysis; rather, they have chosen to use the federal standards to
fulfill the legislatures' intentions that UDAP statutes be employed to the utmost de-
gree in the battle to eradicate all forms of unfair or deceptive business practices. See
American Buyers Club, Inc. v. Hayes, 46 Ill. App. 3d 270, 271, 361 N.E.2d 1383, 1384
(1977). To the extent that these statutes were enacted to foster private assistance to
the FTC in accomplishing its mandate under § 5, see Gross-Haentjens v. Leckenby, 38
Or. App. 313, 589 P.2d 1209, 1210 (1979), it is clear that this objective could not be
achieved except by applying the same standards in consumers' actions.
82. See Appendix col. 5, infra. The legislative directions are stated in various ways.
For example, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act calls for "great weight" to be
given to Federal Trade Commission and federal court rulings. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(C) (Page Supp. 1979). See also ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (Supp. 1979). In Illi-
nois, "consideration shall be given to interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission
and the federal courts relating to § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act" IL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262 (1972). By far the largest number of the statutes contain a
provision calling for federal trade practices law to be used as a guide in construing the
state enactments. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110(b) (West Supp. 1980);
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when a UDAP statute does not speak in such terms, however, state
courts frequently will look to that body of federal law because of the
similarity between the state statutory language and that of section 5,
and because federal law is a readily available and rational source of
authority on the meaning of the broad prohibitions adopted by the
state legislatures.83
The significance of state court adoption of FTC standards in deter-
mining what is "unfair" or "deceptive" in consumer actions is two-
fold. First, the use of the federal tests substantially reduces the re-
quirements of proof consumers must meet to achieve redress for
"consumer fraud," and thus enhances the probability of success in
UDAP litigation.84 Second, consumers have available a wealth of
"good law" interpreting UDAP prohibitions, which they may in rea-
sonable confidence present to the state courts, and with which they
can reasonably be assured of persuading those courts to rule for
them. 85 In the following sections we will review the state courts'
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 2(b) (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1980); 9 VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 2453(b) (1970).
A legislature's direction that the courts are to be "guided" by federal trade practices
law is, of course, inherently ambiguous. It may indicate an intent to limit the courts'
determinations that acts are unfair or deceptive to instances in which the Commission
or federal courts have said so. Cf. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257,
265 (Fla. 1976) (Florida UDAP statute interpreted to require the enforcing and
rulemaking authority to comply with the federal trade law standards in effect on or
before the effective date of the law). On the other hand, the courts which have given
broad construction to UDAP statutes have expressed the view that they are free to go
beyond what the FTC has done. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416
A.2d 170, 174 n.4 (Super. Ct. 1979). This viewpoint appears to represent the trend in the
cases and allows the state courts to deal effectively with the great variety of alleged
unfair or deceptive acts brought to their attention. See note 79 supra.
83. See, e.g., Guste v. Demars, 330 So. 2d 123, 125 (La. App. 1976); note 82 supra;
Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 461-62, 329 A.2d 812, 817-18
(1974). Indeed, the state courts have consistently rejected due process challenges to
these statutes due to the existence of over thirty years of federal precedents, which
cure any "vagueness" problem. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d
520, 530-34 (Alaska 1980); Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 72 ll. 2d 179, 187, 380
N.E. 2d 790, 793-94 (1978); State v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 274-75, 501
P.2d 290, 299-302 (1972).
84. As many courts have recognized, UDAP statutes were intended to relegate the
elements of common-law fraud to the realm of historical curiosity. See, e.g., Heller v.
Sllverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2839, 382 N.E. 2d 1065, 1069-70 (1978);
Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 307, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975).
85. Because it is the federal courts which review FTC actions, see generally 5
U.S.C. §§ 701- 706 (1976), it is safe to assume that state court judges are unfamiliar, or at
least less familiar, with this body of federal trade practices law. The cases demon-
strate, however, that despite their unfamiliarity, state court judges who are required to
construe UDAP statutes are willing to look to a wide variety of sources in doing so.
Federal appeals and Supreme Court decisions are commonly cited. See, e.g., Murphy
v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (Super. Ct. 1979); Commonwealth v.
DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 240, 316 N.E.2d 748, 754 (1974); Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d
561, 563 (Tex. 1978); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 47, 554
P.2d 349, 357-58 (1979). Adjudicated orders of the Commission will be considered. See,
e.g., Guste v. Demars, 330 So. 2d 123, 126 (La. App. 1976); Reiter Oldsmobile v. General
Motors Corp., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2091, 2096-97, 393 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1976); Schubach v.
Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Mass. 1978); PMP Assoc. v. Globe News-
paper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915, 918-19 (1975); Monumental Properties, Inc., 459
Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812, 819 (1974); Vargas v. Allied Fin. Co., 545 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976). While some state courts have stated that FTC consent orders do not consti-
tute "authoritative interpretations" of federal law, see Whittinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kot-
seas, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1262, 1283, 390 N.E.2d 243, 252 (1979), other courts have relied
upon them in construing UDAP proscriptions, viewing the Commission's injunction of
the practices covered in consent orders as indicative of its position that § 5 renders
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treatment of FTC jurisprudence and discuss exemplary cases that
have employed it.
Deception
Like the FTC and many federal courts, state courts have ruled that
the purpose of UDAP provisions is to protect "[t] he ignorant, the un-
thinking, and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to
analyze but are governed by appearances and general impres-
sions. ' 86 Thus, in keeping with the federal interpretations of decep-
tion under section 5, the state courts have said that to prevail in a
UDAP action based upon alleged deception, the consumer need only
show that an act or practice possessed the tendency or capacity to
mislead, or created the likelihood of deception.
87
those, or similar, practices unlawful. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609
P.2d 520, 529 (Alaska 1980); Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So. 2d 571, 577 (La. App. 1979);
Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978). Cf. Invention Marketing, Inc. v. Spannaus, 279 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Minn. 1979) (citing
evidence that defendant's Pennsylvania affiliate entered into FTC consent order to
provide information to customers as evidence that defendant could comply with simi-
lar requirements of Minnesota law). Other courts have considered FTC Rules, see, e.g.,
Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 190, 199, 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (1978); cf. Donnelly v.
Mustang Pools, Inc., 84 Misc. 2d 28, 33, 374 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972-73 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (contract
cancelled because in violation of FTC door-to-door rules), and Guides, see, e.g., State v.
O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520,529 n.8 (Alaska 1980); Williams v. Bruno Appli-
ance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d 219,222-23,379 N.E.2d 52,54-55 (1978). Finally,
a few state courts have turned to FTC advisory opinions, see PMP Assoc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1975), and even Commission com-
plaints, see Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 141 (Mass. 1978); Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1976).
As the foregoing discussion should suggest, private counsel who engage in UDAP
litigation should become familiar with the many judicial and administrative rulings
concerning the lawfulness of practice under § 5. The extent to which counsel search
the federal precedents and carefully lay out the rules they wish the state courts to
employ may well determine who succeeds. Indeed, one court lamented that the parties
had not brought to its attention any FTC or federal court interpretations of unfairness
which related to the acts it was being asked to evaluate under a UDAP statute.
Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Killeen, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 139, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (1979).
The absence of such authority may prove fatal to a plaintiff's action. See Reiter Olds-
mobile v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2091, 2096-97, 393 N.E.2d 376, 378
(1979). The persuasive authority of federal trade practices law may also be employed,
of course, in the defense of a UDAP claim. See, e.g., Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill. App.
3d 190, 199, 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (1978); Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So. 2d 571, 576 (La.
App. 1979); PMP Assoc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915, 918-19
(1975).
86. Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 273, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184, 372 N.E.2d
17, 19 (1977). See also Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 62 Ill. App.
3d 219, 222, 379 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1978); People v. Volkswagen, Inc., 47 A.D.2d 868, 868, 366
N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (1975).
87. See, e.g., Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 62 11. App. 3d 219,
222, 379 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1978); Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2839, 382 N.E.2d 1065, 1069-70 (1978); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322
N.E.2d 768, 779 (1975); State v. Hudson Furniture Co., 165 N.J. Super. 516, 520, 398 A.2d
900, 901-902 (1979); Fenwick v. Kay American Jeep, 72 N.J. 372, 378, 371 A.2d 13, 16
(1977); Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. 1978); Testo v. Russ Dunmire
Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 51, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976); Fisher v. World-Wide
Trophy Outfitters, Ltd., 15 Wash. App. 742, 747-48, 551 P.2d 1398, 1403 (1976). But see
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While proof of common law fraud or deceit necessarily establishes
a violation of the deception prohibition,8 8 the converse is not true, i.e.,
defenses based upon such common law torts ordinarily have no rele-
vance to the issues in a UDAP action.89 In determining whether an
act is "deceptive," the emphasis is on the effect of the actor's conduct
on the consumer rather than on his intent, which is generally unim-
portant.90 The good faith of the alleged violator is consequently not a
defense to a UDAP claim.9 ' Moreover, the consumer's reliance on the
deception is immaterial: reliance need not be pleaded or proved to
establish a UDAP violation for deceptive practices.
92
Unfairness
FTC consumer protection activity under the "unfairness" power is a
comparatively recent development, dating approximately from the
early 1970's and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson.9 3 For that reason, and because the "un-
fairness doctrine" can be used to challenge practices that are other-
wise permissible under state law,94 one would not necessarily expect
the state courts to be receptive to its adoption in the construction of
UDAP provisions. Nevertheless, the decided trend is toward employ-
ment of the "unfairness doctrine" in private actions.
State courts have recognized, for example, that the meaning of "un-
fairness" must be developed by the gradual process of inclusion and
exclusion, through which they may " 'discover and make explicit
those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of
the community may progressively develop."' 95 The circumstances of
Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 200 (Me. 1979) (where "loss of money or property" is an
element of the claim, mere proof of capacity to deceive is insufficient).
88. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975).
89. See e.g., Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2839, 382 N.E.2d
1065, 1069-70 (1978); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768, 799
(1975); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975).
90. See State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 535 (Alaska 1980); Grimes
v. Adlesperger, 67 Ill. App. 3d 582, 585, 384 N.E.2d 537, 539 (1978); Testo v. Russ Dunmire
Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 51, 554 P.2d 349, 357-58 (1976).
91. See American Buyer's Club, Inc. v. Honecker, 46 Ml. App. 3d 252, 259, 361 N.E.2d
1370, 1374 (1977).
92. See Perry v. Hansen, 120 Ariz. App. 266, 270, 585 P.2d 574, 578 (1978); Slaney v.
Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768, 779 (1975). The importation of a
reliance requirement under the statutes would lead the courts into the rules of com-
mon-law deceit, undermining the intent of the legislatures to facilitate consumer re-
dress. To the extent that some requirement akin to reliance is deemed appropriate, it
has been suggested that the consumer simply should be obligated to show that his
purchase occurred at the time of the commission of the deceptive practice. See Wade &
Kamenshine, Restitution For Defrauded Consumers: Making The Remedy Effective
Through Suit By Governmental Agency, 37 GEo. WAsH. L REV. 1031, 1061 (1968).
93. 405 U.S. 233 (1972). See generally Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising -
The FTC Response, 26 FOOD DRuG & Cos. UJ. 609, 616-20 (1971). A good deal of the
recent criticism of the Commission, which culminated in the FTC Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 58), arose as the result
of the agency's employment of its "unfairness" jurisdiction in several subject areas,
most notably children's advertising. See Pub. IU No. 96-252, § 11 (to be codified in 15
U.S.C. § 57a). Despite some calls to do so, however, Congress did not eliminate or sub-
stantially limit the unfairness proscription.
94. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 239 nA (1972).
95. Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234,316 N.E.2d 748, 754 (1974) (quoting L.
Hand, J., in FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936)). This rule
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each case will be considered, and unfairness measured not simply by
determining whether particular conduct is lawful apart from the stat-
utory proscription, but also by analyzing the effect of that conduct on
the public. 96 Thus, even lawful acts may be scrutinized in consumers'
actions under the statutes.9
7
To the extent that they have sought to define the elusive unfairness
proscription, many state courts have explicitly employed the tests
that the FTC originally set forth in the "Cigarette Trade Regulation
Rule,"9 8 as subsequently approved in the Sperry & Hutchinson
case.99 As a result, the analysis of an assertion of unfairness in a pri-
vate UDAP action will proceed, in those courts, much as it would in a
Commission proceeding under section 5. The court must determine
whether a challenged act (1) "without necessarily having been previ-
ously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been estab-
lished by statutes, the common law, or otherwise - whether, in other
words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statu-
tory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is im-
moral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [or] (3) whether it
causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other busi-
nessmen) ."100
The state courts, of course, are not bound to adhere to the FTC's
view of what is "unfair."'10 1 Nevertheless, though some state courts
appear to have given the federal standards little more than "lip-serv-
evolved because "[w] hat is unfair is a definitional problem of long standing, which
statutory draftsmen have prudently avoided. 'It is impossible to frame definitions
which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field.' " Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc.,1979 Mass. App. Ct. 2419, 396 N.E.2d 149, 153
(1979) (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914)). See also Mur-
phy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (Super. Ct. 1979); Perrin v.
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 664, 671-72, 404 N.E.2d 508, 514 (1980); Lowell
Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 65, 385 N.E.2d 240, 249 (1979).
96. See, e.g., Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376, N.E.2d 140, 142 (Mass. 1978);
Lorenz, Inc. v. Northhampton Nat'l Bank, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. 995, 381 N.E.2d 1108, 1109.
97. See Perrin v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 83 Mll. App. 3d 664, 671, 404 N.E.2d 508,
513-14 (1980); Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Mass. 1978);
Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Killeen, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 139, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (1979).
98. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8355 (1964).
99. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
100. Id. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 535 (Alaska 1980);
Covenant Radio Corp. v. Ten Eighty Corp., 35 Conn. Supp. 1, 390 A.2d 949, 955 (1977);
Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (Super. Ct. 1979); Perrin v.
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 664, 670, 404 N.E.2d 508, 513 (1980); Levings v.
Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 1979 Mass. App. Ct. 2419, 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1979); Gendron
Lumber Co. v. Great Northern Homes, Inc., 1979 Mass. App. Ct. 1927, 395 N.E.2d 457,
462-63 (1979); Lorenz v. Northhampton Nat'l Bank, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. 995, 381 N.E.2d
1108, 1109 (1978); Frank J. Linhares Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 357
N.E.2d 313, 316 nA (1976); State v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 327, 233 S.E.2d 895, 905
(1977) (Huskins, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459
Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812, 818-19 (1974); Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 601, 396 A.2d 1385,
1388 (1979).
101. See Vargas v. Allied Fin. Co., 545 S.W.2d 231,233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); State v.
Reader's Digest Assoc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972).
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ice,"102 others have indicated a willingness to use the tests to develop
imaginative rules and remedies in consumer protection litigation
under the UDAP statutes. 0 3
Exemplary State Decisions
As we have just shown, state courts frequently have turned to federal
trade practices law to determine the meaning of the prohibitions con-
tained in UDAP statutes. As the following discussion of certain of the
decided cases illustrates, the impact of the state courts' adoption of
these standards may well be to make virtually all of the FTC's con-
sumer protection jurisprudence privately actionable.
In Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc.,10 4 for example, the plaintiff al-
leged that the merchant seller of a used automobile knew or should
have known that the car's engine was defective at the time of sale,
but had failed to disclose that fact.'05 Specifically relying upon FTC
deception cases, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled
that this allegation was actionable under the state's UDAP statute,
holding that the defendant's failure to disclose had the "capacity or
tendency to deceive the buyer."'1 6 The court emphasized the sharp
distinctions between actions under the Massachusetts statute and
those for deceit, stating:
As numerous FTC cases have made clear, the definition of an action-
able "unfair or deceptive" act or practice goes far beyond the scope
of the common law action for fraud and deceit... [among the dis-
tinctions are that] in the statutory action, proof of actual reliance is
not required... and it is not necessary to establish that the defend-
ant knew that the representation was false.10 7
Gour v. Daray Motor Co.,10 8 another deception case, involved a re-
cent, highly-publicized consumer issue. The plaintiff-consumer, an
"Oldsmobile man," had purchased a so-called "Chevymobile" - a
1977 Oldsmobile Delta 88, later found to have a Chevrolet engine.10 9
After all the furor over the hybrid vehicles began, and Gour discov-
ered the engine substitution in his car, he brought araction against
General Motors and his Oldsmobile dealer seeking to rescind the sale
and to recover damages and attorney's fees." 0 He alleged, in part,
that the defendants had violated the Louisiana UDAP statute by fail-
ing to disclose facts concerning the product which, if known to a pro-
spective buyer, would have influenced the decision to purchase."'
102. See, e.g., Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 601, 396 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1979).
103. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A-2d 170, 174 (Super. Ct.
1979); notes 137-47 infra and accompanying text; Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376
N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Mass. 1978); notes 129-36 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Ford Mo-
tor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 485-86 (Ky. 1978) (truck warranty which failed to rec-
ognize rights of buyers under U.C.C. "unfair" under state UDAP statute); notes 150-59
infra and accompanying text.
104. 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975).
105. Id. at 696, 322 N.E.2d at 771.
106. Id. at 702-703, 322 N.E.2d at 778.
107. Id. at 703, 322 N.E.2d at 779.
108. 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1979).
109. Id. at 573.
110. Id. at 574.
111. Id. at 573.
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Following a trial court judgment for the plaintiff, General Motors ap-
pealed on the ground that the engine substitution complied with sec-
tion 5. For support, it cited the FTC's dismissal of a 1957 complaint
involving the advertising of "genuine Chevrolet [replacement] parts"
that were allegedly manufactured by outside vendors, rather than by
any General Motors division." 2 The Gour court, however, saw con-
siderable differences between that case and one involving a major,
original component of a new automobile." 3 Furthermore, it noted
that the Commission had issued a complaint against General Motors
in 1978 for the very engine substitutions at issue, and that the FTC
proceeding had been terminated by a consent order."4 In view of this
disposition of the FTC's more recent charges, and the federal authori-
ties defining deception under section 5, the Gour court concluded
that the engine substitution was capable of deceiving the buying pub-
lic and, therefore, violated the Louisiana UDAP statute." 5 Rescission
was permitted, and the plaintiff recovered the full purchase price
($8,100) less a minor deduction for use, and an award of statutory
attorney's fees.1 16
Two additional deception cases even more clearly illustrate the
propensity of state courts to rely upon FTC determinations. In
Thomas v. Sun Furniture & Appliance Co.," 7 a creditor engaging in
debt collection in Ohio employed forms captioned, "Notices of Court
Action to Collect Debt," which threatened debtors with wage garnish-
ment within fifteen days unless payment was made.11 The notices
were sent to debtors before any judgment against them had been ob-
tained. Under Ohio law, however, the personal earnings of a debtor
112. Id. at 576.
113. Id. at 576-77.
114. Id. at 577.
115. Id. at 578.
116. Id. The failure or omission to disclose has been used as the basis for a decep-
tion claim in numerous other UDAP cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
412 F. Supp. 641, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (plaintiff alleged failure to disclose airline's delib-
erate overbooking policy; court found, however, no violation of state statute or com-
mon law fraud); Brooks v. Midas-Int'l Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d 266, 269-70, 361 N.E.2d 815,
817 (1977) (advertising a warranty offering a "free" replacement muffler, without dis-
closing that purchasers would be charged for replacement of associated installation
parts); York v. Sullivan, 369 Mass. 157, 161-62, 338 N.E.2d 341, 345-46 (1975) (failure to
disclose that leases in publicly-subsidized housing would not prevent rental increases
by landlord during term); Fenwick v. Kay American Jeep, Inc., 72 N.J. 372, 378, 371 A.2d
13, 16 (1977) (omission of automobile odometer readings in advertisements); Stone v.
Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 105-106, 245 S.E.2d 801, 807 (1978) (failure to
disclose that home was constructed on land filled with "vegetable matter"); Common-
wealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 483-84, 329 A.2d 812, 829 (1974) (land-
lords' failure, in leases, to inform tenants of the existence of statutory tenant remedies,
some of which were unwaiveable); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash.
App. 39, 51-52, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976) (failure to disclose that a "muscle car", sold as a
passenger vehicle, had been modified and previously used in racing).
117. 61 Ohio App. 2d 78, 399 N.E.2d 567 (1978).
118. Id. at 79-80, 399 N.E.2d at 568.
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clearly could not be attached before judgment.119 Recognizing that
the likelihood of deception is the appropriate criterion by which to
judge whether an act is deceptive, 120 and relying expressly upon FTC
and federal court precedents involving similar debt collection prac-
tices, 2 1 the court held that because the notice would falsely create
the impression in the average person's mind that a judgment had
been rendered against him and that his wages could be attached, pos-
sibly causing him to lose his job, the notices were deceptive as a mat-
ter of law.122
Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 123 the last de-
ception case we will discuss, was a class action for injunctive relief
and damages in a typical "bait and switch" case.1 24 The plaintiff al-
leged that she had responded to an advertisement depicting a three-
piece furniture set priced at $298; when she inquired about the set at
the store, however, she was told that the "sofa alone" was $298. She
was then persuaded to buy different, more expensive furniture.125 On
appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the action, the Illinois appel-
late court first observed that on the basis of settled federal principles,
an advertisement could be held deceptive on its face if it created the
likelihood of deception and, further, that advertising should be evalu-
ated not on the basis of the technical meaning of the phrases used,
but rather by the net impression it is likely to make on the general
public. 12 6 More significantly, the court tested the allegations of "bait
and switch" tactics against the FTC's "Guides Against Bait Advertis-
ing,"12 7 and held that under those FTC interpretations of section 5,
the consumer's allegations clearly stated a claim.128
119. Id. at 82-83, 399 N.E.2d at 570.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Ohio court cited several of the classic FTC cases involving the practice
colloquially known as "bluebacking" (using legal simulations): Chrysler Corp. v. FTC,
561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d
921 (6th Cir. 1968). Other FTC cases on debt collection practices include Slough v. FTC,
396 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968); In the Matter of Neighbor-
hood Periodical Club, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 93 (1972). The Commission has acted many times
against the use of debt collection practices as in Slough and Neighborhood Periodical,
and has promulgated rules concerning them in Guides Against Debt Collection Decep-
tion, 16 C.F.R. § 237 (1980).
122. Thomas v. Sun Furniture & Appliance Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 78, 82, 399 N.E.2d
567, 570 (1978). See also Fukuhara v. Huff Agency, Ltd., 607 P.2d 1304, 1307-1308, 1312-14
(Hawaii 1980) (deceptive representation that attorneys' fees may be added to debt be-
ing collected); Liggins v. May Co., 44 Ohio Misc. 81, 373 N.E.2d 404, 405-406 (C.P. 1977)
(deceptive collection notices containing false statements and simulated official docu-
ments); State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, 530 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex. 1975) (sending of
notices which simulated legal process or action by public officials).
123. 62 IIl. App. 3d 219, 379 N.E.2d 52 (1978).
124. A "bait and switch" is a deceptive sales practice which usually involves the
advertising of a low-priced product to lure customers to a store, and then inducing
them to buy higher-priced models by failing to stock sufficient quantities of the lower
priced item to satisfy demand, or by disparaging the less-expensive product. See
Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
125. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 221, 379 N.E.2d at 53.
126. Id. at 222; 379 N.E.2d at 54.
127. 16 C.F.R. § 238 (1980).
128. Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 223, 379 N.E.2d
at 55. Many other UDAP decisions have involved consumer complaints about pricing,
quality and similar deceptive representations; many of the decisions in those cases
also implicate the FTC's jurisprudence. On price representations, see, e.g., State v.
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Although fewer of the state court decisions have dealt with "unfair-
ness," several cases are notable. The leading case is Schubach v.
Household Finance Corp., 2 9 in which consumers challenged alleged
"distant forum abuse.' 30 The plaintiffs asserted that the filing of col-
lection actions in locations inconvenient to debtors for the purpose of
precipitating default judgments, making defense of the actions more
difficult, and securing more favorable judgments than would other-
Crossroads Gallery, Inc., 357 So. 2d 1381, 1382-83 (La. App. 1978) (advertising a 50%
savings on oil paintings, where they were sold at substantially lower prices at another
location 90% of the time); Crooks v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 285 Or. 481,
487-91, 592 P.2d 196, 199-201 (1979) (erroneous advertisement for a $3.29 razor at a price
of $.89, coupled with failure to redistribute correction, warrants consumer's recovery of
$200 minimum statutory damages); Sanders v. Francis, 277 Or. 593, 595-99, 561 P.2d 1003,
1004-1006 (1977) (advertisement of automobile before and after its sale for $3,098, when
seller actually charged purchaser $3,898); State v. Ralph Williams' Northwest Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 265,268-69,510 P.2d 233,236-37 (1973) (deceptive price compar-
isons, advertising of discounts and representation of prices on auto stickers).
As to representations of product or service qualities or features, see, e.g., Attaway v.
Tom's Auto Sales, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 813, 813, 242 S.E.2d 740, 741 (1978) (representation
that automobile was in "perfect running order" and that the seller would "take care of
any problem," where sales contract contained broad warranty disclaimer); American
Buyers Club, Inc. v. Honecker, 46 lL App. 3d 252, 361 N.E.2d 1370, 1371-75 (1977) (repre-
sentations that club membership would entitle consumer to obtain merchandise at
substantial savings, and that certain "name brand" goods would be available); Heller v.
Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 1065, 1068-69 (1978) (rep-
resentation that land had good drainage); Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 267
Or. 512, 514-17, 517 P.2d 661, 662-63 (1973) (pictorial and written representation on pack-
age that tent had a rear window with a zippered flap); Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d
561, 564 (Tex. 1978) (representation of model year of pleasure boat); Woo v. Great
Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (representa-
tions concerning franchise/distributorship opportunities in motivational products
marketing operation - award of treble damages of $18,555 plus $3,000 attorney's fees);
Mallory v. Custer, 537 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (representation that re-
pairer of "R.V.'s" was a "Coleman authorized dealer").
Other deceptive practices cases, which we have characterized here as "miscellane-
ous," include: Clayton v. McCrary, 426 F. Supp. 248, 260 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (failure to
include material oral representation into written contract of sale for motor vehicle);
Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 51-53, 385 N.E.2d 240, 243-44
(1979) (overcharging for natural gas supplied to consumers by employing deceptive
accounting procedures to allocate debt expense to inventory); of., Daaleman v. Eliza-
bethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. Super. 267, 268-73, 390 A.2d 566, 567-70 (1978) (company over-
stated actual price and quantity of gas purchased and reflected this overstatement in
its monthly bills to customers); State v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 6, 8-11, 281 N.W.2d 729, 732-34
(1979) (representations in connection with "professional modeling school" enroll-
ments, e.g., that students would be able to earn back all or most of tuition charged on
modeling assignments); Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332 N.E.2d 380, 385-86 (C.P.
1974) (failing to refund moneys received where goods are not delivered; acceptance of
money for goods or services and allowing unreasonable periods of time to pass without
delivering, offering and making refunds, or offering alternatives; failure to honor war-
ranty of merchantability); Our Fair Lady Health Resort v. Miller, 564 S.W.2d 410, 413
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (representation that health spa contract would be voided if con-
sumer changed her mind after signing it); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 918-19
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (representations concerning home repairs under warranty);
Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656, 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (repre-
sentation that salesman had authority to negotiate sales price of auto and coercing
agreement to pay higher price); State v. Hudson Furniture Co., 165 N.J. Super. 516, 518-
21, 398 A.2d 900, 901-902 (1979) (failure to afford furniture customers with options in
writing when promised delivery dates are not met).
129. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 376 N.E.2d 140 (1978).
130. 376 N.E.2d at 141.
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wise be possible, was unfair under the Massachusetts UDAP stat-
ute.131 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, following FTC
precedent, held these allegations actionable as "unfair practices"
even though the pertinent state venue provisions permitted House-
hold Finance to file its collection actions in the forums about which
the plaintiffs had complained. 132 The court relied in large part upon
the Seventh Circuit's enforcement of an FTC cease and desist order
in Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 33 which dealt with similar venue practices in
the context of interstate collection actions. Spiegel held that the
'Commission has the power to enjoin a company from bringing collec-
tion actions in locations inconvenient to debtors even if the practice
is lawful under state law.134 Although the order in Spiegel was en-
forced only insofar as it related to out-of-state consumers,135 the Mas-
sachusetts court agreed with the plaintiffs in Schubach that this
distinction made "no absolute difference in deciding whether the
practice of a creditor is unfair."'13 6
Murphy v. McNamara,137 a Connecticut trial court decision, repre-
sents another recent example of a state court's creative use of the
FTC's unfairness tests. In Murphy, the consumer, a welfare recipient,
"leased" a television set under an agreement that provided that she
could become the owner of it, "without establishing credit." The de-
fendant never advised the plaintiff that a total payment of $1,268
would be required in order to own the set under the agreement.138 A
reasonable retail sale price for the T.V. set would have been $499.139
After approximately six months, the plaintiff read a newspaper arti-
cle criticizing the T.V. "lease" plan, consulted counsel, and stopped
131. Id. at 140.
132. Id. at 142-43. But see Vargas v. Allied Fin. Co., 545 S.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976), in which the court declined to follow FTC cases and rejected an attack on
distant forum practices under the Texas UDAP. That statute, however, covered decep-
tive acts, not unfair practices. Moreover, the Texas legislature subsequently amended
the UDAP statute to provide that the filing of a collection suit in a distant forum is a
deceptive act. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.46(b) (22) (1979).
133. 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976). The Massachusetts court in Schubach also cited
with approval two Commission consent orders which were not appealed. 376 N.E.2d
140, 141 nA (Mass. 1978) (citing In re Commercial Serv. Co., 86"F.T.C. 467 (1975); In re
Montgomery Ward & Co., 84 F.T.C. 1337 (1974)).
134. 540 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1976) (relying on FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405
U.S. 233, 244 (1972)).
135. 540 F.2d at 296.
136. Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Mass. 1978). The court
noted that the Commission's position in the Seventh Circuit had been that certain in-
trastate "distant forum" practices could be unfair under § 5. Id.; see Spiegel, Inc. v.
FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 296 n.12 (7th Cir. 1976).
Following the remand in Schubach, which was filed as a class suit, see 376 N.E.2d at
141 n.2, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. At the time of this writing,
they were on the verge of entering into an agreement on the following terms: (1) any
class member inconvenienced by H.F.C.'s venue practices will receive $25; (2) any
pending action in which a class member asserts a defense or counterclaim will be
transferred to a court in the locale of the consumer's residence; and (3) plaintiff's
counsel will receive attorneys' fees of $4000. Telephone Interview by authors with
Richard Alpert, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs, National Consumer Law Center, Boston,
Massachusetts (May 1, 1980).
137. 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (Super. Ct. 1979).
138. 416 A.2d at 173.
139. Id.
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making payments. 14° Soon afterwards, she was subjected to numer-
ous telephone calls and written communications from the lessor
threatening to repossess the T.V., to commence civil suit against her,
and to have her criminally prosecuted.14 ' The plaintiff commenced an
action against the lessor seeking injunctive relief and damages under
the Connecticut UDAP statute. She contended that the purported
lease was in fact a conditional sale, that the price charged for the T.V.
set (which was over two and one-half times the retail price) was un-
conscionable under the Uniform Commercial Code and, therefore,
that the defendant had committed unfair trade practices by entering
into such an agreement with her and by using harassing collection
practices against her.142
In a lengthy opinion, the Murphy court granted the consumer a
preliminary injunction against repossession of the T.V. and any fur-
ther creditor harassment.143 After reviewing the FTC's unfairness
standards, the court discussed the refusal of courts to enforce "op-
pressive" contract terms in general, and those relating to price in par-
ticular, under the unconscidnability doctrine of the Uniform
Commercial Code.'4 It found this unconscionability rule to consti-
tute the public policy of the state, to which the defendant's selling
techniques were clearly offensive. 45 The court noted, moreover, that
the FTC had indicated, in dicta, that "the use of unconscionable sell-
ing prices can, by itself, constitute an 'unfair'. . . practice ... in vio-
lation of section 5 ... ."146 Accordingly, the court held that "an
agreement for the sale of consumer goods entered into with a con-
sumer having unequal bargaining power and which agreement calls
for an unconscionable purchase price, constitutes an unfair trade
practice under [the Connecticut UDAP statute]."147
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 173-76.
143. Id. at 180.
144. U.C.C. § 2-302.
145. 416 A.2d at 176.
146. Id. (quoting In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1406 (1968), affd, Tashof v.
FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 712-713 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). The court found substantial similarities
between Ms. Murphy's case and the situation in Tashof, most notably, that there had
been representations of "easy credit" to a consumer whose bargaining power clearly
was unequal, combined with the charging of unconscionable prices. Id.
147. 416 A.2d at 177. A number of other courts have encountered UDAP claims in-
volving allegedly unfair price, credit or contract terms, collection practices or the use
of creditors' remedies. On price, credit or contract terms, see, e.g. Fletcher v. Security
Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 591 P.2d 51, 55-56 (1979) (calculating "per annum" inter-
est rates on loans on the basis of a 360-day year may be an unfair trade practice);
Bondanza v. Peninsula Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 260, 262-63, 590 P.2d 22, 23 (1979)
(assessment of a one-third collection commission on patients' bills turned over to a
collection agency was an unlawful unfair business practice); Perrin v. Pioneer Nat'l
Title Ins. Co., 83 IL App. 3d 556, 404 N.E.2d 508, 509-10 (1980) (title insurance company's
practice of granting builders, developers, contractors and others engaged in real estate
development substantial discounts, which were disproportionate and unrelated to any
purported economy or saving inuring to the company by reason of obtaining their busi-
1980]
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes,148 applying a state unfairness provision,
calls into question the sanctity of the "limited warranty" given by
most automobile and other consumer product manufacturers, and
suggests that protections afforded by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act,149 which is enforced by the FTC through section 5,150 may be
ness, is alleged by plaintiff to be an unfair trade practice resulting in real estate pur-
chasers being required to pay higher prices for title work); Commonwealth v. DeCotis,
366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748, 754 (1974) (inclusion of unconscionable lease terms,
under which mobile home park owners imposed fees upon lot tenants as a condition of
allowing sale of their mobile homes, is an unfair practice); Commonwealth v. Monu-
mental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 814, 828 (1974) (inclusion of illegal, uncon-
scionable and/or unconstitutional provisions in residential leases, e.g., waiver of
exemptions, right to distrain tenant's property); Safeguard Investment Corp. v. Com-
monwealth, 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 417, 404 A.2d 720, 721 (1979) (usury statutes do not com-
prehensively cover all activities that are related to the cost of borrowing money but
which are not charged or reflected as interest rates per se - usurious lending covered
by UDAP); Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (defendants
engaged in an "unconscionable act or course of action" by inducing plaintiff widow to
pay $29,669A5 within two months for dance lessons, and by attempting to coerce her
into entering into another dance contract costing $49,000 - treble damages of $78,000
plus attorneys' fees awarded); Laviana v. The Howard Bank, No. C400-75 Cnc (Vt.
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1976), slip. op. at 2 (charging consumers who would not receive cards
or numbers bank credit card rates on "cash advances" may be usurious and an unfair
practice).
On collection practices or creditors' remedies, see, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investiga-
tions, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 524-25 (Alaska 1980) (threats that debtors would be immedi-
ately arrested or placed in jail, telephone calls to relatives or employers about debtors,
and representations that credit ratings would be impaired); Mechanics Nat'l Bank v.
Killeen, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 130-40, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1233-37 (1979) (unfairness chal-
lenge to repossession and sale of secured property, prior to acceleration of maturity
dates on notes and default by debtor, in "erroneous" belief that creditor had right to do
so); Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 337 N.E.2d 701, 703-704 (1975) (numer-
ous harassing telephone calls at early or late hours, totalling 180 calls in nine weeks;
use of false identities; threats of legal action not taken; use of offensive, embarrassing
and abusive language; in-person harassment at debtors' residence; employer contacts,
and a litany of other "aggressive" tactics over a period of thirteen months); Frank J.
Linhares, Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 357 N.E.2d 313, 316 (1976) (re-
fusal to deliver possession of truck to owner unless owner agreed in writing to release
repairer from warranties on the repairs); State v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233
S.E.2d 895, 896 (1977) (repeated, harassing, abusive, demeaning and threatening collec-
tion calls by telephone; phone calls at place of employment and to employers); Love v.
Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1974) (landlord's seizure of tenant's
property and refusal to return it, i.e., distraint, where landlord had not evicted tenant
by judicial process - treble damages awarded).
148. 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978).
149. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2301-2312 (1976), enacted in
1975, regulates the terms and conditions, and disclosure thereof, of written warranties
given on consumer products. All written warranties must be designated either "full" or
"limited" under its provisions. See id. § 2303(a). Because a written warranty desig-
nated "full" must meet (or will be deemed to incorporate) certain stringent minimum
federal standards, see id. §§ 2303(a) (1), 2304(e), most product manufacturers presently
give "limited" warranties seeking to diminish their liability in the event of product
defect or failure.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (1976). Warranty problems have been a constant and fre-
quent source of difficulty for consumers. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7705-16, which provided the ba-
sis, in part, for enactment of the Magnuson- Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1976).
As an alternative to actions under the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty provi-
sions, consumers have often turned to UDAP statutes to obtain redress. For the most
part, however, actions involving warranty problems rely upon the prohibition against
deceptive acts in the statutes. See, e.g., Attaway v. Tom's Auto Sales, Inc., 144 Ga. App.
813, 242 S.E.2d 740, 741-42 (1978) (complaint alleging misrepresentations in the sale of
an automobile stated a separate claim under state statute apart from breach of war-
ranty contract claim); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768, 778
(1975) (failure to disclose a defective engine was a cognizable claim under state stat-
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available to consumers in state UDAP actions.
In Mayes, Ford gave the buyers of a new truck a twelve month or
12,000 miles "limited" warranty covering repair or replacement of de-
fective parts.' 5 ' The truck quickly developed severe rear end
problems. Some six months after the sale, the parties discovered that
the truck had a bent or twisted frame. 52 The buyers then brought it
back to the dealer and gave written notice of revocation of accept-
ance. 5 3 Subsequently, Ford told the dealer that it would only repair
or replace defective parts and that it would not repurchase the truck,
give the buyers a new one, or extend the original warranty on it, due
to longstanding company policy. 5 4 As a result, the dealer refused the
buyers' demand for a full refund or replacement, precipitating their
lawsuit.' 5 5
The Mayes alleged, in part, that Ford had committed an "unfair"
practice in violation of the Kentucky UDAP statute by adopting the
unconscionable policy of refusing to recognize consumers' legitimate
UCC remedies. 5 6 Ford's position was that its "limited" warranty pro-
vision and the stance that it adopted were lawful trade practices, au-
thorized by the state's UCC. 57 Disagreeing with Ford, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for the buyers. 58
It reasoned that when Ford failed to correct the truck's defects within
a reasonable time, the repair or replacement remedy it had given
failed of its essential purpose under the UCC provision governing
limitation of remedies. 5 9 At that point in time, the court ruled, the
buyer was entitled to invoke other UCC remedies for warranty
breach, including revocation of acceptance, notwithstanding the "lim-
ited warranty.' 1 60 In the court's view, Ford's insistence that it should
be allowed indefinitely to try to correct the defect was an unconscion-
able refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of buyers under the
ute); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1977) (statement by builder that
repairs to sewer system placed it in good working order created an express or implied
warranty and was a "deceptive" practice); Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485,
489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (defendant's oral representation purporting to give a war-
ranty was untrue).
151. 575 S.W.2d at 483.
152. Id. at 484.
153. See U.C.C. §§ 2-607, 2-608.
154. 575 S.W.2d at 482.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 482-83.
157. Id. at 482.
158. Id. at 488.
159. 575 S.W.2d at 484. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2). This is not by any means an unusual
holding in consumer warranty actions. See, e.g., Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91
Misc. 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682, 684 (Civ. Ct. 1977). The court's further, unique rulings
concerning the effect of Ford's actions under the UDAP statute, however, merit close
attention.
160. 575 S.W.2d at 484.
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UCC and, therefore, an unfair practice. 161 The court might have
reached the same conclusion more directly by finding liability under
Magnuson-Moss - therefore a violation of section 5 - which might
constitute a per se violation of the state UDAP statute.
Some Practical Aspects of UDAP Litigation
In the foregoing sections of this article we have described the ex-
isting case law under UDAP statutes, pointing out how it potentially
integrates all of the FTC's consumer protection jurisprudence. Our
discussion has suggested that private enforcement of this important
jurisprudence is now possible in the state courts. We wish to make it
clear, however, that such enforcement is not merely theoretically
possible, but that it is now feasible and should be attractive to advo-
cates. Accordingly, we will discuss three practical topics below -
remedies, class actions, and attorneys' fee awards - which provide
further incentives for continued expansion of the role of private liti-
gants in the enforcement of FTC jurisprudence in state court actions.
Remedies
As we have already described in general, UDAP statutes offer a pano-
ply of consumer remedies and afford considerable incentive to sue by
holding out the prospect, in many instances, of recovery of more than
actual damages. 162 In addition to damages, many of the statutes pro-
vide the remedy of rescission which, when coupled with court awards
of costs and counsel fees, will undoubtedly serve in many instances
to make consumers whole and to encourage legal representation.163
The proper measure of actual damages in UDAP actions is unclear.
In a number of instances, the courts have utilized either the "out-of-
pocket" damages rule 164 or one that allows the recovery of the rea-
sonable cost of remedying defects in a product. 165 In making these
determinations, when actual damages are not ascertainable with pre-
cision, the courts will employ the customary rule requiring reason-
161. Id. at 485. The court approved the buyers' recovery of damages and a substan-
tial attorney's fee. Id. at 488.
162. See notes 68-78 supra and accompanying text.
163. See generally Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1979), dis-
cussed in the text at notes 108-16 supra. The rescission remedy ordered by the court in
that case enabled the consumer to obtain $6,762.65 of the $8,122.65 he had originally
paid for his 1977 "Chevymobile." See 373 So. 2d at 578-79. This entitlement was com-
puted on the basis of a deduction for the use of the vehicle (during a period of roughly
fourteen and one-half months) at $.08 per mile, for 17,000 miles. In addition, Gour's
attorney received a court-awarded fee of $2,000. Id. at 574. The practicality of Gour's
individual UDAP action is highlighted by comparing the relief he obtained with the
proposed subclass settlement in In re G.M.C. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d
1106, 1116 (7th Cir. 1979), which provides for the payment of $200 per affected vehicle
owner in exchange for a release of all claims.
164. See, e.g., Jack Criswell Lincoln Mercury v. Haith, 590 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979); cf. Potter v. Dangler Mobile Homes, 61 Ohio Misc. 14, 401 N.E.2d 956, 962
(C.P. 1977) (court allowed plaintiff the sum he spent repairing his defective mobile
home, in suit brought under Uniform Commercial Code).
165. See, e.g., Young v. DeGuerin, 591 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); Harrison
v. Dallas Court Reporting College, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 813, 816-17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (dic-
tum).
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able certainty rather than mathematical exactness. 66 As an
additional incentive to plaintiffs, some courts appear to allow recov-
ery of damages for mental distress in UDAP actions; 167 others, how-
ever, have declined to do so in the absence of physical injury.16 8
In cases in which injury to consumers is not quantifiable, or when
damages would be inadequate under the "out-of-pocket" rule, the
courts may allow recovery under the "benefit of the bargain" rule,
which entitles a consumer to the difference between what she actu-
ally received in the transaction and what she would have received
had the deceptive representation actually been true.169 Employment
of a "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages would enable con-
sumers to take more effective action against various practices tradi-
tionally proscribed by the FTC. 7 0 Assume, for example, a deceptive
pricing case in which a consumer purchases a power lawnmower for
a "sale price" of $200 in response to an advertisement that represents
the "regular price" to be $259. In reality, the "regular price" of the
lawnmower has been $209. If the "value" of the lawnmower is $200 or
more, the consumer is arguably not out-of-pocket any money.' 7 ' If he
is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, however, the measure of dam-
ages in a UDAP action would be $50 (doubled or trebled along with
attorneys' fees, under an appropriate statute).
In other cases in which proof of the extent of a consumer's loss is
difficult, the courts' use of reasonable inferences in connection with
minimum damages provisions will make consumer actions feasible.
The court's analysis in Scott v. Western International Surplus Sales,
166. See, e.g., Young v. DeGuerin, 591 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
167. See, e.g., Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671-72 (Tex. 1977); Salois v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 358, 581 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1978); Murphy v. McNa-
mara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170, 178 (Super. Ct. 1979).
168. See, e.g., Young v. DeGuerin, 591 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex Ct. App. 1979); American
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
169. See York v. Sullivan, 369 Mass. 157, 165, 338 N.E.2d 341, 341 (1975) (where land-
lord's deceptive practices lead a tenant to believe that the rent will be stable during the
one year term of a lease, tenant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain the landlord
induced him to think he was making); cf. Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256, 262 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1980) (damages for violating state UDAP in real estate transaction measured
either by "out of pocket" damages or "loss of bargain," whichever is greater). The ap-
plication of the "benefit of the bargain" rule in deceit cases is generally set forth in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977).
170. Entitling the consumer who seeks redress for injury caused by such practices
to recover the greatest amount of actual damages established by the proofs serves the
dual purpose of UDAP statutes to encourage consumer litigation of grievances and to
deter unlawful conduct. See Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d
290, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
171. In the context of a bait and switch case, one commentator has suggested, for
example, that no recovery should be allowed the consumer "absent proof that the item
the customer was switched to was overpriced in comparison to products of like grade
or quality in the seller's trade area." See Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against
Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57 MARQ. L REV. 559, 602 n.282 (1974). The commenta-
tor recognized, however, that imposition of this burden would surely result in no con-
sumer recovery and would undermine the deterrent purposes of the law. Id.
19801
Inc., 17 2 is instructive in this regard. In Scott, the consumer paid $38.86
for a tent that had been represented, pictorially and in writing, to pos-
sess a feature it did not have. 7 3 After discovering that the tent did
not have the represented feature, the consumer demanded a refund,
which the seller refused.174 The consumer consequently brought suit
under the Oregon UDAP statute seeking the $200 minimum damages
recovery and attorneys' fees. 75 The seller argued that the proof war-
ranted no recovery because the consumer could not show any ascer-
tainable loss, as required by the statute.176 Disagreeing, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that "ascertainable" meant, simply, capable of
being discovered or established. 177 Because the inference from the
proof was that the tent, as represented, had a value equal to its sale
price, the fact that the tent did not have the represented feature justi-
fied the inference that its value was less than that price.17 8 This dif-
ference in value was an ascertainable loss, despite the lack of proof of
its amount, and supported the consumer's recovery of minimum
damages of $200 and reasonable attorneys' fees. 179
Finally, there is the question of when multiple damage awards are
proper.180 When damage awards are not automatically multiplied
under UDAP statutes, the consumer may be required to show a
knowing violation.' 81 This requirement, however, ought not to deter
consumers from seeking multiple damage recoveries. Under some of
the statutes, knowledge that practices were proscribed will be im-
puted whenever the state attorney general has published a rule de-
fining unfair or deceptive acts or practices, or has publicly indexed a
court decision that held an act or practice to be unfair or deceptive. 182
Moreover, recent FTC activities hold great promise for easing bur-
dens of proof on the question whether the violation was knowing.
Under a provision of the FTC Improvements Act of 1975,183 the Com-
mission has collected its key decisions involving a wide range of con-
sumer problems, has prepared synopses of their holdings, and is in
the process of sending these synopses to industry members (other
than the respondents in those FTC proceedings) who may also be
172. 267 Or. 512, 517 P.2d 661 (1973).
173. 517 P.2d at 663.
174. Id. at 662.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 663.
178. Id.
179. Id. See also Riviera Motors, Inc. v. Higbee, 48 Or. App. 545, 609 P.2d 369, 373
(1980).
180. See notes 72-78 supra and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.05(A) (3)-(4), .09(B) (1979). In other
cases knowledge may be inferred from the objective circumstances of the case. Thus,
in B & B Motors, Inc. v. Broman, Unrep. Consent Judgment, No. 79 CV 37194 (Ohio
Mun. Ct., Hamilton Cty., Mar. 1, 1980), the court noted that even if there had been no
intent to deceive or misrepresent, the plaintiff's use of printed forms of cognovit notes
or warrants of attorney to confess judgment in consumer transactions constituted
knowing violations of Ohio's UDAP statute, "in that the documents used were printed
form documents and were knowingly used in the transaction between the parties." Id.,
slip. op. at 3.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1) (b) (Supp. I 1979).
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engaging in the prohibited practices. 8 4 The records showing which
companies have been sent the synopses may be available to con-
sumer-litigants under the Freedom of Information Act. 185 If it can be
shown that the defendant in a UDAP action was served with a Com-
mission synopsis in the relevant area, a court may reasonably infer
that the defendant knew or had reason to know that his conduct vio-
lated a UDAP statute, providing justification for a multiple damage
award.
Class Actions
Despite the availability of state-level private enforcement of FTC ju-
risprudence, consumer litigation specifically tracking Commission in-
itiatives has been limited. The reluctance of counsel to provide
representation in small UDAP cases may explain this neglect. One
procedural option, however, may increase the bar's interest in such
actions. When the nature of the acts challenged and available proce-
dures warrant and permit class actions, the greater monetary stakes
will make UDAP actions more attractive to advocates. 186 Because the
class action device was designed to ensure that a forum would be
available for the small claimant and the uninformed,187 and to assist
in the deterrence of mass frauds and other wrongs, 188 it is ideally
suited to consumers' UDAP claims.
In recognition of the importance of class suits to the effective en-
forcement of UDAP proscriptions, sixteen state statutes explicitly al-
low class actions to be used. 8 9 Although the case law under these
provisions is sparse, the courts appear to have adopted a decidedly
pro-consumer attitude toward these class suits. As the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court remarked, in noting that the class ac-
tion provision of the Massachusett's UDAP statute reduced the
discretion ordinarily possessed by courts to deny class status on the
basis of the "predominance" and "superiority" requirements con-
tained in class action rules patterned on Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(b) (3): "[t]he statute has a more mandatory tone .... [It]
184. The purpose of this so-called FTC "non-respondents program" is to establish
recipients' knowledge of acts determined by the FTC to be unfair or deceptive, which
are covered by prior cease and desist orders. In the event of a violation, such knowl-
edge would subject the recipients to high civil penalties. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m) (1) (A)-
45(m) (1) (C) (Supp. 1I 1979).
185. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
186. See Dole, supra note 3, at 1111. As Chief Justice Burger recently remarked in
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. 1166 (1980), "For better or worse, the
financial incentive that class actions offer the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of
the increasing reliance on the 'private attorney general' [and]... an evolutionary re-
sponse to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of govern-
ment." Id. at 1174.
187. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
188. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 807-808, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 800-801 (1971).
189. See Appendix col 11, infra.
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was designed to meet a pressing need for an effective private remedy,
and. . . traditional technicalities are not to be read into [it] in such a
way as to impede the accomplishment of substantial justice."'190
A recent example of the flexible treatment courts have given to
UDAP class actions is Hogya v. Superior Court.'9 ' In Hogya, a class
of 350,000 consumers sought damages from meat packers who were
alleged to have sold falsely upgraded beef to Navy commissaries.
192
The defendants had successfully opposed class certification in the
trial court, arguing that in deciding a class action motion, the court
had discretion to consider certain criteria aside from those enumer-
ated in the UDAP statute's class action provision. The two additional
criteria the defendants convinced the trial court to consider - and
upon which the court based its decision to deny class status - were
whether a class suit would provide a substantial benefit to the public,
and the probability that each member of the class ultimately would
come forward, identify himself, and prove his separate claim to a por-
tion of the total recovery.193 The court of appeals, however, rejected
all of the defendants' contentions on appeal, and concluded that the
UDAP statute mandates class certification when its four exclusive
criteria are met; no additional criteria may be considered in making
the class certification decision.'94 As the court observed, evaluation
of the "public benefit" of the suit was improper, because the legisla-
ture already had determined that in satisfying the statutory criteria,
class suits promote the public interest by compelling violators to dis-
gorge wrongfully obtained profits and deterring deceptive prac-
tices.19 5 In addition, to give consideration to the probability that each
class member would come forward to make a claim, the court rea-
soned, would nullify a statutory procedure designed to allow action
against those who bilk individual consumers of only petty
amounts.
196
In other jurisdictions, the availability of class actions in UDAP
cases will depend upon the existence of a provision comparable to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and upon how the courts construe
their UDAP statutes and any such rule. Among the primary problems
that have motivated the federal courts to deny class suits under Rule
23 have been those of predominance of common questions and man-
ageability.197 Predominance should not present a difficult hurdle in
consumers' UDAP class actions. Given the adoption of the federal de-
ception and unfairness standards by many state courts, a number of
questions upon which defense counsel traditionally have made suc-
190. Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 40-41, 337 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1975).
191. 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 142 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1977).
192. Id. at 127, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
193. Id. at 129, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
194. Id. at 140, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
195. Id. at 136, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
196. Id. at 133-40, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 333-37.
197. Compare Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299-301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969) with Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343,345-47 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
compare In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88-92 (9th Cir. 1974) with Eovaldi
v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 547 (N.D. Il. 1972).
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cessful arguments on the predominance issue, for example, intent,
reliance and knowledge, simply will be irrelevant. 198
On the other hand, many state courts tread upon relatively unfa-
miliar territory when they deal with class suits; state court judges
may well believe that they do not possess the resources to deal with
them. In those instances, counsel for consumers must emphasize
that a court has great flexibility to deal with problems occurring dur-
ing the course of a class action, and an obligation to use its imagina-
tion and energies to structure the course of the action so that it may
proceed to benefit the alleged victims.199 To overcome judicial reluc-
tance to become entwined in class actions, plaintiffs' counsel must
present clear, simple, and inexpensive plans of management to the
state courts.20 0 Still, the indication is that state courts are willing to
address and handle such cases and the added complexity they may
entail. 0 '
Attorneys' Fees
Self-interest has motivated counsel to provide their services in liti-
gating private antitrust and securities actions, in which substantial
court-awarded fees are commonplace.20 2 Although the magnitude of
statutory fee awards available in UDAP actions is not nearly as great
as in the antitrust and securities areas, state court decisions do pro-
vide a basis for believing that consumer advocacy is becoming more
economically feasible to practitioners.
Again, the UDAP fee provisions vary, with some calling for
198. See e.g., Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 449-54, 591 P.2d 51,
55-59, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31-36 (1979) (proof of each borrower's lack of knowledge unnec-
essary); Brooks v. Midas-Int'l Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d. 266, 272-73, 361 N.E.2d 815, 819-20
(1977). Cf. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 814, 484 P.2d 964, 972, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796, 804 (1971) (reliance must be proved, but not necessarily by direct evidence; reli-
ance may be inferred from extrinsic evidence). See also notes 80-103 supra and accom-
panying text.
199. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4), 23(d); Dolgow v. Anderson 43 F.R.D. 472, 492
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
200. See State v. Blue Bird Body Co., 71 F.R.D. 606, 616 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
201. See, e.g., Hernandez v. United Fire Ins. Co., 79 F.RD. 419,432-33 (N.D. Ill. 1978);
Fletcher v. Security Pac. Natl Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 449-55, 591 P.2d 51, 55-59, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 28, 32-36 (1979); Williams v. Bruno Appliance & Furniture Mart, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d
219, 219-23, 379 N.E.2d 52, 52-55 (1978); Barliant v. Follett Corp., 74 Ill. 2d 226, 230-40, 384
N.E.2d 316, 318-23 (1978); Browder v. Harley-Dawson Cadillac Co., 62 ll. App. 3d 623,
625-33, 379 N.E.2d 1206, 1208-13 (1978); Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 39-
46, 337 N.E.2d 701, 705-709 (1975); McGillvrey v. Budget Fin., Inc., [1972-73] 6 CiMAR.
REV. 555, 556 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1972); Miles v. N.J. Motors, Inc., 32 Ohio App. 2d 350, 291
N.E.2d 758, 763-66 (1972); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 807-21, 484 P.2d 964,
968-78, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800-10 (1971); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704-17, 433
P.2d 732, 739-48, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731-40 (1967).
202. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 164-70 (3d Cir. 1973) (antitrust); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v.
Foster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 86-92 (1st Cir. 1969) (antitrust); Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 983,
985-90 (1975) (securities). See generally Attorney Fee Awards In Antitrust and Securi-
ties Class Actions, 6 CLASs ACTION REP. 82 (1980).
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mandatory awards 203 and some appearing to accord complete discre-
tion to the courts. 0 4 The state courts have recognized, however, that
absent attorneys' fee awards, the private remedy provisions of UDAP
statutes frequently would not provide adequate encouragement for
consumers to sue.205 Accordingly, they have been relatively generous
in making fee awards, and do not necessarily consider themselves
constrained to limit the size of awards by reference to the amount of
damages awarded in the underlying consumer actions.20 6
The decisions under UDAP statutes nevertheless provide little gui-
dance concerning the standards governing the courts' exercise of dis-
cretion in favor of a fee award, or the factors that courts will take into
account in arriving at the amount of a fee. Strong arguments can be
made in favor of using the rules developed by federal courts on these
issues. On the discretion question, for example, many of the state
statutes make fee awards available to a "prevailing" plaintiff or party.
Federal courts considering fee awards in the civil rights area have
consistently interpreted this language to mean that a prevailing
plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney fee unless special cir-
cumstances would render such an award unjust. ' 20 7 Because the in-
tent underlying the fee provisions in UDAP statutes is virtually
identical to that of their civil rights counterparts - to provide an in-
centive for private litigation seeking the vindication of important
public policies 20 8 - state courts have ample reason to adopt the same
approach in consumer actions.
The same holds true for the federal standards used to determine
the amount of the fee that will be awarded. At least one state court
has indicated an inclination to employ criteria similar to those set
forth in the leading federal case, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc.,20 9 in arriving at an attorney fee award in a UDAP action.
In Linthicum v. Archambault,210 the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court said:
203. See Appendix col. 12, infra; see, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(4) (West
1975).
204. See Appendix col 12, infra; see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 367.220(3) (1970).
205. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes,
575 S.W.2d 480, 488 (Ky. 1978).
206. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 488 (Ky. 1978) (fee of $5,000
on damage award of approximately $4,000); Riviera Motors, Inc. v. Higbee, 45 Or. App.
545, 609 P.2d 369, 371 n.4 (1980) (costs and fees of $1,121.70 on minimum damage award
of $200 plus $10,000 punitives); Tate v. Wiggins, 583 S.W.2d 640, 644-45 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (fee of $4,300 on actual damages award of $1,900); Williams v. Loftice, 576 S.W.2d
455, 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (fee of $14,500 on damage award of $6,200); Riverside Nat'l
Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553, 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (fee of $6,700 on actual dam-
ages award of $3,000). Cf. Lazar v. Towne House Restaur. Corp., 142 N.Y.S2d 315, 322
(1955) (small size of plainfiff's recovery from defendant would not deter the court from
awarding a substantial fee in case not arising under state UDAP statute).
207. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). See Chris-
tianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of
Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1973).
208. Compare cases cited at notes 71, 205 supra with Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968). See Civil Right Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), described in S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7, re-
printed in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5908, 5908-14.
209. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
210. 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2661, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979).
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While the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee is largely discretion-
ary, the judge ... should consider the nature of the case and the
issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of dam-
ages involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar services by
other attorneys in the same area, and the amounts of awards in simi-
lar cases.211
Because the goal of fee provisions is to promote meritorious private
suits to ensure full enforcement of the statutory proscriptions, 212
state courts that have liberally construed UDAP statutes should be
receptive to using these criteria in consumers' UDAP actions. In ad-
dition, not only does a wealth of case law explain the federal crite-
ria,2 13 but the federal criteria are also regarded as relatively easy to
use. Adoption of such consistent and rational rules on fee awards in
UDAP actions undoubtedly would encourage more attorneys to un-
dertake such cases.
Part III: The Justification For Consumer Enforcement
And Future Prospects For The Use of UDAP
Statutes
Justifications
The explicit and positive recognition many state courts have given to
FTC jurisprudence creates a solid basis for private consumer liti-
gants to undertake state court challenges to practices that violate
section 5. Regardless of the direction the FTC takes in the future, un-
fair and deceptive practices in the marketplace will continue to
plague the consumer.214 As a public agency having a certain exper-
tise, and benefitting from its broad perspective on the national econ-
omy, the FTC is especially well-situated to develop consistent,
211. Id. at 2668-69, 398 N.E.2d at 488; cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (court of appeals remanded civil rights class action
case to the district court on the issue of the award of attorneys' fees, because the dis-
trict court had failed to explain the factors upon which the award was based and be-
cause no differentiation was made between the experienced and inexperienced
attorneys representing the plaintiff). It is particularly significant that the Massachu-
setts court articulated these standards in a case in which it also ruled that legal sevices
organizations, whose clients are not billed for services rendered, are entitled to receive
statutory attorney's fee awards. Thus, that state court's views appear to be in harmony
with those of the United States Supreme Court, which recently indicated in an em-
ployment discrimination case that a party's representation by a public interest group
is not a "special circumstance" that would render a fee award unjust. See New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 n.9 (1980).
212. See, e.g., Jones v. Seldon's Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 886, 887-88
(E.D. Va. 1973) (under the Truth-in-Lending Act).
213. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244, 249-53 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
214. See Gard, supra note 15, at 279; D. CAPLOVrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 192 (1963);
Hearings on H.R. 2213 and H.R. 2367 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
34 (1979).
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reasoned consumer protection policy.2 15 Effective enforcement of this
policy, however, has always been and will continue to be controver-
sial and inherently limited.216
Even though the Commission is now statutorily-empowered to
seek consumer redress, the circumstances in which it will do so are
limited by law and, perhaps because of budgetary and political con-
straints, the gap between policy and enforcement efforts that directly
benefit consumers will widen. 2 17 One reason for this gap is that the
FTC must select cases carefully because of scarce budgetary re-
sources. As a result, no matter how judicious the case selection, the
Commission will always be vulnerable to charges of partiality and
arbitrary enforcement.2 1 8 Although selective enforcement may exert
a deterrent effect on would-be violators, it will not reach many cases
of simple non-compliance. Moreover, the Commission cannot devote
much of its resources to the pursuit of the small operator or fly-by-
night business.219
Additionally, the FTC faces the central problem of government: bu-
reaucratic inefficiency. The agency has long been regarded as one of
the most inefficient of all government agencies because it achieves
disappointing results per dollar spent on enforcement.220 A dramatic
increase in the FTC's budget - an unlikely prospect in the near fu-
ture - might increase the scope of its enforcement efforts. An in-
creased budget for a government agency, however, rarely increases
its efficiency; perhaps the opposite is more likely to occur.
We believe that the best solution to the serious limitations on pub-
lic enforcement of unfair trade practices law is the expansion of pri-
vate enforcement under state UDAP statutes. Fostered by multiple
215. See notes 8-17 supra and accompanying text; Comment, Private Enforcement
and Rulemaking under the FTC Act: Expansion of FTC Responsibility, 69 Nw. U. L.
REv. 462, 475 (1974).
216. See A. STONE, EcoNOMIc REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREsT 179 (1977).
Stone has asserted-
Over the years the FTC has expended considerable effort inseeking to con-
trol deceptive and unfair practices. Yet, if one may judge by the enormous
volume of complaints that consumers and businessmen continue to make
... the agency's impact has not been great. One of its major short-comings
has been its inability to obtain accurate, reliable, marketplace information.
In the past it relied largely on complaints submitted by affected business-
men. The cost of this approach ... has been a good deal of attentiveness to
matters of little moment to consumers' safety, health or economic priorities.
Id.
217. See Givens, supra note 63, at 4; note 57 supra.
218. See, e.g., Universal-Rundle Corp. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd
387 U.S. 244 (1967).
219. Former Commissioner Phillip Elman has summarized the inadequacy of FTC
enforcement:
Voluntary compliance and cease and desist procedures are ... meaning-
less and unthreatening. Such a swindler does not need to be told by a regis-
tered letter from Washington that he is violating the law - he knows it, and
his sole purpose is to continue his frauds as long as possible. The cease and
desist order... will merely order the respondent to sin no more... for
such racketeers, there is virtually no sanction and thus no effective deter-
rent.
Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures: Hearings on the Consumer
Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 63, 65 (1970) (statement of Phillip Elman).
220. See, e.g., Nader Report; ABA Report, note 32 supra.
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damage recoveries and realistic attorneys' fees awards, private
UDAP litigation can be expected to eliminate the gap between the
inherent limitations on FTC efforts and the needs of aggrieved con-
sumers. Private enforcement is not subject to accusations of partial-
ity or arbitrariness: the process is random when compared with the
FTC's selective enforcement.22 1 By allowing consumers to enforce
FTC jurisprudence, the states have opted, in part, for a private mar-
ket solution in lieu of government regulation. Clearly, no level of FTC
funding could ever approximate the collective enforcement energies
of consumers using UDAP statutes. Effective private enforcement
thus offers the best deterrent against wrongdoing in the marketplace.
The private enforcement of law, however, is not without its social
costs: nuisance suits, court congestion, and lack of incentives to min-
imize damages are the major distortions encountered when private
parties believe that substantial recovery is available through the
courts.22 2 The incentive to bring nuisance suits is compounded when
the outcome of litigation is unpredictable, damage is highly specula-
tive, the issues of law are vague, and the jury issues are complex.
Settlement of many antitrust suits occurs, for example, because cor-
porate managers opt for the predictability of loss through settlement
rather than hazard the uncertainties of the judicial process, even
221. See Becker & Stingier, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation for
Enforcers, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 15 (1974); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 28 (1975).
222. These phenomena are encountered in both personal injury litigation and treble
damage suits brought under the antitrust laws. When a greater probability of collect-
ing damages is coupled with the larger damage awards permitted by law, there is a
greater incentive to bring suit. See K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES:
A STuDY IN LAW AND EcONOmics 81-96 (1976). Elzinga and Breit term these inefficien-
cies found in antitrust actions the "perverse incentives effect": a private party fails to
modify his behavior when the damages available to him exceed the cost to him of
avoiding the damage. Id. at 84. Because the potential litigant believes three-fold com-
pensation is forthcoming, there is no incentive to minimize damages, perhaps the op-
posite. Id. Another inefficiency caused by the treble damage remedy is the
"misinformation effect," or the tendency for a private party to claim that anticompeti-
tive harm has occurred when it has not. Id. at 90. This effect is a primary stimulus for
nuisance suits. Nuisance suits are encouraged by the possibility that the defendant
will settle out of court rather than risk the uncertainty of a trial. Id. A third inefficiency
is termed "reparations cost," or the use of resources to determine and allocate dam-
ages among the parties. Id. at 95.
To counteract these inefficiencies, the authors suggest a publicly enforced, fine-ori-
ented system:
Under the ideal solution, the monopolistic sellers would be fined enough to
cause them to cease and desist all monopolistic behavior, but they would be
exempt from paying compensation to anyone who purchased from them.
[W] ith no potential compensation, perverse incentives and misinformation
effects would be eliminated and the ... costs of the reparations process
would vanish.
Id. at 113. Public agencies also can experience the perverse incentives and the misin-
formation effects, although perhaps to a lesser degree than private parties. For exam-
ple, instead of bringing suit for the sole purpose of fortune, the government official may
pursue an alleged violator for fame. In addition, there is always the danger that an
agency will choose an inappropriate cause to pursue or simply bring suits that can be
won easily. See generally G. TOLLOcK, THE POIrICS OF BUREAUCRACY 18-32 (1965).
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when the actual risk of large losses in litigation is perceived to be
small.
2 2 3
Compared with treble damage suits under the antitrust laws, the
incentive for nuisance suits under UDAP statutes is minimal. The is-
sues involved in a UDAP suit invariably will be less vague and com-
plex than the difficult determination of competitive injury in antitrust
litigation.224 The result in an action brought under a state UDAP stat-
ute will therefore be more predictable, and defendants will be able to
weigh settlements on the basis of a more accurate assessment of the
risk of losing. Moreover, in contrast to antitrust cases, UDAP actions
will not involve enormous monetary recoveries. With smaller stakes,
the rewards will be less attractive for prospective bounty hunters.225
By providing incentives to bring these private actions under UDAP
statutes, the state legislatures appear to be more interested in pro-
viding recovery to those victimized by market abuses than in mini-
mizing court congestion. Under traditional remedies, the cost of
litigation and attorneys' fees rendered most suits against consumer
frauds impractical, regardless of the merits of the claim.226 The
states, in remedial fashion, have now provided aggrieved consumers
with a more effective redress mechanism to encourage the assertion
of valid claims.227 It is our belief that consumers shortly will take
more advantage of these mechanisms to enforce the FTC's jurispru-
dence.
223. The nuisance suit is also typical of the personal injury area, particularly when
the cause of action is based on strict liability. For a description of the settlement proc-
ess in personal injury cases, see L. Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS
OF INSURANCE CLAIMs ADJUSTMENTs 204-11 (1970).
224. In antitrust law, the precise nature of the activity that is often found unlawful
is unclear. Guilt or innocence cannot often be predicted from the facts. As Elzinga and
Breit state, "Refusals to sell, franchise terminations, exclusive dealer arrangements,
territorial agreements and other such marketing violations as well as non-horizontal
mergers, involve so many combinations and permutations of fact situations that a con-
fident prediction of guilt or innocence is difficult." K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note
222, at 91.
The kinds of violations involved in UDAP statutes, although falling into broad cate-
gories of deception and unfairness, are far less complex in law and fact than most
antitrust violations. Both judge and jury are able to make a determination about a
consumer fraud violation much more easily than they can determine the economic
consequences of various marketing practices in antitrust litigation. Moreover, UDAP
litigation differs from many antitrust cases on the question of standing. The ambiguous
nature of antitrust violations presents difficult issues of who has legal standing to bring
an antitrust suit. This adds to unpredictability and promotes nuisance suits which in
turn are settled because of this unpredictability. UDAP suits, by comparison, do not
present these difficult issues of standing; the injury is direct and ascertainable.
225. The awards in antitrust litigation can be truly astronomical as, for example, in
the recent AT & T-MCI litigation (MCI recovered $1.8 billion). See [1980] ANlrrRuST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A3 (June 19, 1980). It has been suggested that recoveries
such as these represent a transfer of wealth from the corporations to lawyers. See Han-
dler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust Suits: The
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 10 (1971). Damage awards
under UDAP statutes are designed to compensate the consumer for the injury he has
incurred much like the damages in personal injury litigation. Treble damage awards
are recognized under some UDAP statutes, but unlike their counterparts in antitrust,
they are often limited to knowing or wilfull violations. Generally, the scope of UDAP
litigation is more limited and focused, in substance and remedy, than is antitrust litiga-
tion.
226. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transactions Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569 (1968).
227. See notes 68-85 supra and accompanying text.
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Conclusion - Future Prospects
Although the decisions indicate some uncertainty about how far to go
in adopting the federal jurisprudence, we believe that as litigants in
private actions make the state courts aware of the wealth of authority
contained in this body of law, they will move closer to an approach
that more comprehensively uses the FTC's pronouncements. In par-
ticular, we expect state courts to begin to adopt a per se approach 228
with respect to acts that consumers challenge in UDAP actions, when
those acts are alleged to transgress the standards of behavior set
forth in FTC trade regulation rules or federal consumer protection
statutes enforced by the Commission through section 5. These provi-
sions may be viewed as defining practices that are "unfair or decep-
tive. '2 29 Litigants employing UDAP statutes should not only urge
228. See generally Note, State v. Reader's Digest Association - A Knockout Punch
to Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in Washington?, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 529 (1975).
229. Virtually all FTC rules define "unfair or deceptive" acts or practices by their
very structure - beginning with a phrase like, "it is [or constitutes] an unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice. . . for a seller, directly or indirectly, to ... " and following it
with various specifically prohibited acts. See, e.g., Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1980); Cooling-Off Period for Door-to- Door Sales, 16
C.F.R. § 429.1 (1980). See also Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, 40
Fed. Reg. 16,347 (Apr. 11, 1975). Some of the cases decided by state courts suggest that
they will treat violations of rules promulgated under § 5 as violations of their UDAP
statutes. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 529-30 (Alaska 1980);
cf. Household Fin. Corp. v. Mowdy, 13 l1l. App. 3d 822, 827, 300 N.E.2d 863, 867 (1973)
(attempted waiver of defense clause required by state consumer fraud act ineffectual).
The ability of consumers to enforce these rules may depend upon the willingness of
state courts to do so because consumers cannot sue under § 5, and the rules are not
self-executing. Take the "door-to-door sales" rule as an example. Suppose that Mary X
purchases an expensive vacuum cleaner from a Y Vacuum Cleaner Co. salesperson
who solicits the sale in Mary's home, and the salesperson fails to provide Mary with
written notice of her right to rescind or an oral explanation of this right. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 429.1(a)-(e) (1980) (Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales provisions). Mary exe-
cutes an installment contract which obligates her to pay $800, and which (fortuitously)
contains the FTC "Holder Rule" legend, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1980); the contract is later
transferred to the Z Finance Co.
Suppose further that about twenty days after the sale, the cleaner begins to give
Mary trouble, and she has second thoughts about having obligated herself to make the
payments. She cannot, however, find the seller, and the FrC Cooling-Off Period Rule
does not expressly extend her right to rescind until she receives the proper notices. Cf.
12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1980) (Truth-in-Lending rescission provision). What can Mary do?
We submit that it is reasonably clear in this example that Mary can employ a UDAP
statute to obtain rescission of the transaction at this time. Having failed to comply with
the FTC Rule, her seller committed an unfair or deceptive act. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1
(1980). Mary has a claim against her seller under a typical UDAP statute which she
might assert if she could locate the Y company. Although she cannot do so, the "Holder
Rule" legend preserves that "claim" as against Z Finance Co. Thus, in order to obtain a
refund of any moneys she has already paid and cancellation of the contract, Mary
could sue Z Finance Co. under a UDAP statute, seeking the remedy of rescission.
Whether she also might be entitled to counsel fees in such an action is an interesting
question. Would the "Holder Rule" legend, limiting 'recovery hereunder" to amounts
already paid by the debtor, preclude such an award in UDAP litigation which was
made necessary by a financer's refusal to recognize a consumer's claims? The ques-
tion of fees should be separate from the contractual preservation of claims effectuated
(and limited) by the FTC holder legend. Moreover, the refusal of fees in such a situa-
tion would undermine the purposes of the statutory fee provision.
Consumers may make similar use of recent federal consumer protection statutes
1980]
that these administrative rules and statutory provisions create cate-
gories of UDAP violations, but also that they establish public policies
to which the state courts may look even when the alleged violators do
not fall precisely within the scope of their provisions.3 0
More comprehensive adoption of FTC standards will have advan-
tages for both consumers and the business community. The acquisi-
tion of up-to-date information and advice concerning Commission
activities will serve the business community's need for predictability
regarding potential liability under both section 5 and UDAP provi-
sions. Consumers will be provided with more opportunities to act
which are enforced by the FTC; their provisions can be read as making any statutory
violation a violation of § 5 as well. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692L(a) (Supp. I1 1979) ("For purpose of the exercise by the Commission of its
functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a violation of this sub-
chapter shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that
Act"); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (1976) ("[i]t shall be a viola-
tion of section 45(a) (1) of this title... for any person to fail to comply with any re-
quirement imposed on such person by this title (or a rule thereunder) or to violate any
prohibition contained in this chapter (or a rule thereunder".)); Truth-in-Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1976) ("a violation of any requirement imposed under this sub-
chapter shall be deemed a violation of a requirement imposed under the [Federal
Trade Commission] Act"); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) (1976) ("a
violation of any requirement or prohibition imposed under this subchapter shall con-
stitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act . . ."); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c)
(1976) ("a violation of any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be
deemed a violation of a requirement imposed under the [Federal Trade Commission]
Act").
When violations of these statutes are at issue, consumers may fare better by premis-
ing their claims upon UDAP statutes than by pursuing the private remedies the fed-
eral statutes give. Thus, when a Truth-in-Lending disclosure violation is claimed to be
an unfair or deceptive act or practice, the consumer may be able to recover $200 in
minimum damages under a UDAP statute rather than $100 under the Truth-in-Lending
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (A) (1) (1976). Or, when the activities of a collection
agency violate the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the consumer
may be entitled to treble his actual damages on a UDAP theory, instead of recovering
actual damages (and "additional damages" in the court's discretion, not exceeding
$1,000) under the federal statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (1), (a) (2) (Supp. 1I 1979).
Several state courts have examined this interrelationship in UDAP cases. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 1978 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 220, 374 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1978)
(Truth-in-Lending and UDAP); Ellis v. Hensley, No. 39126, slip op. at 9-10 (Ohio Ct.
App., Aug. 16, 1979) (Truth-in-Lending and UDAP); Smith v. S.G. & B. Inc., No. A
7900178, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1979) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and UDAP); Hennigan v. Heights Saving Assoc., 576 S.W.2d 126, 129-30 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978) (Truth-in- Lending and UDAP); Myers v. Lesage, No. C291-75 Cnc (Vt. Super. Ct.
May 15, 1978) (Truth-in-Lending and UDAP). Cf. Standish v. Hub Motor Co., 149 Ga.
App. 365, 366, 254 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1979) (settlement and release of federal Truth-in-
Lending claim does not bar subsequent UDAP action); American Buyers Club, Inc. v.
Grayling, 53 Ill. App. 3d 611, 613, 368 N.E.2d 1057, 1059 (1977) (violation of Truth-in-
Lending disclosure requirements affords consumer defense of illegality to enforce-
ment of contract).
230. For example, although the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
appear to be inapplicable to creditors collecting their own debts, even through "in-
house agencies," see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (Supp. I1 1979), the statute can hardly be
read to enunciate a federal policy approving such practices as harassment, oppression,
or abuse of any person in connection with the collection of a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d
(Supp. I1 1979), when performed by creditors themselves. The opposite is obviously
true, i.e., that there is a clear national policy against the sorts of behavior covered by
the substantive provisions of that statute. A state court should be free under the
Sperry & Hutchinson tests, see notes 93-103 supra and accompanying text, to measure
a creditor's collection practices against those standards of behavior. See Smith v. S. G.
& B., Inc., No. A 7900178, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1979) (creditor's communi-
cation with debtor's employer other than as authorized by Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act is an unfair and unconscionable act).
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against abusive practices and easier burdens of proof in actions seek-
ing private redress for injury. In sum, increased use of the FTC's ju-
risprudence in private UDAP actions will fully serve the purpose of
those statutes and section 5 - to eradicate unfair or deceptive acts or
practices from the mercantile environment.
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